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LOCAL, NATIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES
1.1 The world forests and deforestation
Forests cover about 4 billion hectares worldwide which represents 30.3 percent of total land
area. Deforestation is deﬁned as a radical removal of vegetation, to less than 10 % crown
cover (FAO). This deﬁnition refers to a change in the land use and long term removal of tree
cover (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1998). Annual loss of tropical forests was estimated at 15.4
million hectares per year in the 1980’s (FAO, 1992), and at 12.7 million hectares per year
in the 1990’s (FAO, 1997). Net annual loss was estimated at 7.3 million hectares per year
in the Global Environment Outlook (UNEP, 2006). Latin America and Caribbean region,
with the largest proportion of forest area, had a decrease in the forest cover from 49.2 per
cent cover in 1990 to 45.8 per cent in 2005. Africa also shows a continued net loss of forest
area with 21.4 per cent in 2005, compared to 23.6 per cent in 1990. Forest areas in Europe,
North America, Asia and Paciﬁc regions remained stable and even increased slightly during
this period. Overall countries where deforestation is the most severe are developing countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Myanmar, Mexico, Nigeria,
Sudan (Smouts, 2002)).
Deforestation represents a major environmental concern. Indeed, forests provide many
environmental services both at local and global levels. Locally, forests provide important hy-
drological beneﬁts, as they prevent soil erosion and ﬂood hazard. Globally, forests sequester
carbon, and are therefore important to limit global climate change. For instance, it is esti-
mated that deforestation accounts for up to 20 percent of the global greenhouse gas emissions
(www.FAO.org). Moreover, tropical forests are the most valuable ecosystem in the world:
between 50 and 90 per cent of the earth species live in tropical forests (WCED, 1987). Fi-nally, forests are not only an environmental indicator, but also an exploitable resource, which
can create wealth and local development.
Overall deforestation is at the frontier of development and the environment, and forests
constitute both an environmental concern and a renewable resource. Deforestation and forest
issues are therefore a very interesting and challenging research object. Forests are a perfect
illustration of the poverty-environment nexus, but are also concerned by important and
broader development issues, such as corruption, rent-seeking behaviors, and economic and
environmental management. They also constitute a global environmental concern, which
implies continental and global interactions, and even individual citizens interventions. The
aim of this thesis is therefore to consider those three types of interactions involving forest
issues: forest’s local characteristics in a poverty context, national forest management and
corruption, international environmental concerns.
1.2 Forests and people
Among all the deforestation causes, agricultural expansion appears to be the most important
one. Indeed, the share of deforestation related to agricultural expansion has been estimated
at at least 50 per cent (Myers, 1992; UNEP, 1992) and to 70 per cent in the 1990’s (UNEP,
2003). In Africa, which is the area with the highest deforestation rates in the world, more
than 50 per cent of the deforested zones were switched into small ﬁrms. Deforestation is
therefore mostly unplanned and beyond the direct control of governments. It is therefore
crucial to understand which links exist between people and forests.
Poverty and environmental degradation are often said to constitute a vicious circle
(SARDC, IUCN and SADC 1994 in GEO 2000, Chapter 2). Poor people are dependent
on the environment, and thus overuse it, which makes them even poorer. The Brundtland
report (1987), the ﬁrst to underline the importance of poverty in environmental degradation,
was followed by the 1992 Rio conference. The implicit conclusion of this link is a win-win
potential of helping poor countries to develop and to protect the environment at the same
time. Concerning the deforestation process, this vicious circle analysis appears to be appro-
priate, given that poor households are the main agents of deforestation. In Africa, this linkappears to be related to the low productivity and input use of smallholder agriculture, which
leads to land degradation and agricultural expansion (Reardon et al., 1999).
More than 1.6 billion people depend to varying degrees on forests for their livelihood.
About 60 million indigenous people are almost wholly dependent on forests. Some 350 mil-
lion people who live within or adjacent to dense forests depend on them to a high degree
for subsistence and income. In developing countries, about 1.2 billion people rely on agro-
forestry farming systems that help to sustain agricultural productivity and generate income.
Worldwide, forest industry provides employment for 60 million people. Some 1 billion peo-
ple depend on drugs derived from forest plants for their medical needs (World Bank, 2001).
Disregarding the problem of having deﬁned precisely the concept of forest dependency (see
Wollenberg and Ingles, 1998), it appears that forest-dependent people, who are poor for the
most important part, constitute a real challenge for development and the environment. A
crucial issue is thus to state which are the conditions upon which forest conservation and
development can be reconciled. An important factor to consider here is whether agricultural
development tend to use land on the intensive or the extensive margin.
Diﬀerent types of forest use can be elaborated by the households, depending essentially
on their market integration. A typology of these strategies is provided by Angelsen and
Wunder (2002). First, the specialized strategy, related to a high integration into markets, is
related to a high contribution of forest products to the households income - this strategy ﬁts
with the Asia case. Second, the diversiﬁcation strategy, also related to a high integration
into markets, only gives a marginal share of income to the forest products - this is the
case for Latin America. Third, the coping strategy is associated to a low share of income
from forest products and a low integration into markets. This last strategy does not imply,
however, that households do not depend on forest, since they may use forest resources for
direct consumption. The coping strategy is often seen in Africa. The ﬁrst strategy allows an
explicit important contribution of forest products to income, with extraction being a main
activity of the household. In contrast, the last two strategies give forest product extraction
a risk-management role: a relatively low importance in terms of income, but a useful tool to
smooth household consumption.
Chapter 2 analyzes this insurance use of No n - T i m b e rF o r e s tP r o d u c t s( N T F P )b yp o o r
households and its potential impact on deforestation. In the ﬁrst part of the chapter, I ap-ply a simple model of land use by agricultural households. The representative agricultural
household chooses how the land will be used, between agricultural land and forests. It faces
a simple trade-oﬀ: agriculture is more proﬁtable, but riskier, while NTFP extraction is safer
but less productive. The variables inﬂuencing the land use are therefore agricultural prof-
itability, NTFP quantities, agricultural risk and risk aversion. This ﬁrst part thus consider
the extensive use of the land.
Overall, it appears in this context that risk reduction tends to increase deforestation.
Indeed, if agricultural risk reduces, the household will naturally increase the agricultural area
and reduce the forest area. For example, the introduction of an insurance or micro-credit
mechanism would increase deforestation. In the same manner, if the household becomes less
risk-averse, it will decrease its NTFP extraction to focus more on agriculture, and thus will
deforest more. Finally, if forests provide a lot of NTFP, the household tend to keep more
land into forests.
In the second part of the chapter, I consider the fact that risk may impact labor allocation
and not only land use choices. In this section, I show that in the case where only labor is
allocated in order to cope with risk, the use of commonly-held forests as insurance may
lead to a poverty-trap situation if the population in need of insurance is too large, and if
the resource has a too small capacity. In these circumstances, the introduction of insurance
schemes may lead to win-win situations, of alleviating poverty and relaxing pressure on the
resource.
However, even if poor people are important agents of deforestation and forest degradation,
it appears that larger landholders and richer economic agents, such as logging ﬁrms, have
also an important role in forest concerns (World Bank, 2006).
1.3 Forest management, corruption and illegal logging
Forests do not only constitute a crucial resource for poor households, but are also an ex-
ploitable resource at a macro-level. Forestry sectors generally represent a small share of the
countries GDP. In 2000, forestry sectors contributed for about 3% to 5% of GDP in Brazil,
Guyana, Suriname, Paraguay, Chile, Latvia, Estonia and some African countries. Over-
all, forestry sectors contributed to 1.5% of GDP in Africa, 1.1% in Western Europe, 1.7%in Latin America and 1.2% worldwide (FAO, 2004). Nevertheless forests employ about 13
million people worldwide and forestry may be the main activity in less developed regions.
Forests can therefore be a part of a country’s long term development, but also a source
of voracity, rent-seeking behaviors, and even crime. As any other resources, forests need
good institutions, sustainable policies and eﬀective enforcement to participate in countries
development without jeopardizing environmental quality.
Corruption constitutes in this context a very important issue. Indeed, corruption is a ma-
jor problem in many developing countries. For instance, the World Bank targets corruption
indicators as one of the main target conditioning international aid. Concerning forest issues,
corruption and poor institutions are very important patterns of unsustainable exploitation.
It has been estimated that illegal logging induces losses of 10 billion dollars a year in assets
and revenue and 5 billion dollars in revenue through tax evasion (World Bank-IMF meetings,
Singapore, 2006). Moreover, illegal logging has important environmental consequences, since
it leads to forest over-exploitation, forest degradation and deforestation.
Chapter 3 therefore analyzes the relationship between bureaucratic and governmental
corruptions, forestry sectors and forest over-exploitation. Indeed, two kinds of corruption
are distinguished in a two-stages model. In the ﬁrst stage, the forest policy is given, which
the logging ﬁrm has an incentive not to respect. Thus the ﬁrm may bribe the bureaucratic
agents in charge of controlling logging practices. Moreover, both the inspected ﬁrm and the
bureaucrat may be audited by an independent corrupt authority. Unsurprisingly, punishing
harder the ﬁrm and the bureaucrat when convicted of irregular behavior reduces forest over-
exploitation. Moreover, a larger area of exploited forest and less stringent harvest rules
reduce over-exploitation. Finally, a larger number of ﬁrms exploiting forest resources tends
to increase exploitation intensity.
In the second stage, the choice of the forest policy is considered. Logging ﬁrms may lobby
the government so that it set less stringent forest policy (i.e. harvest rules and the size of
exploited forest). If the lobby is well organized, i.e. with low coordination costs, a larger
number of exploiting ﬁrms leads to larger area of exploited forests and less stringent harvest
quotas. Moreover, a cascade eﬀect seems to deﬁne this type of relationship: the corrupt
government tends to set a larger number of exploiting ﬁrms, which increases the lobby’s
inﬂuence and bureaucratic corruption. Thus it appears that more corrupted countries arelikely to have larger number of ﬁrms exploiting their resource, less stringent harvesting rules
and more important bureaucratic corruption.
Chapter 4 investigates empirically the links between natural resource endowments,
growth, deforestation and institutions. Indeed, the resource curse literature highlights a
negative relationship between resource endowments and growth. An important transmission
channel of this resource curse is determined by corruption and poor institutions: resource
wealth may lead to sloth in institutions development and greed in resource appropriation.
These sins are in turn likely to slow economic growth. The paper considers two kinds of re-
source curses. First, a classic resource curse is considered, focusing on forest endowments. It
appears here that forests do not represent enough economic inﬂuence to constitute a resource
curse. Second, the fact the the corruption transmission channel may also lead to poor envi-
ronmental management is considered. The hypothesis of an environmental resource curse is
thus tested. Focusing on deforestation, it appears that countries with important timber ex-
ploitation tend to deforest more than countries with smaller forest exploitation. This result
supports the idea that forest exploitation is mainly unsustainable worldwide. Moreover, this
tendency is robust to the addition of corruption and institutions indicators.
1.4 Forests as a global public good: international action and citizens
interventions
Forests do not only constitute a local resource and environmental indicator, but also have
global properties that put the issue on the international agenda. Indeed, as already men-
tioned, carbon sequestration by forests is an important tool against global warming. More-
over, primary forests is the main biodiversity reservoir. UNESCO lists several forest site,
because of their wildlife wealth, in its World Heritage list (Australia, Brazil, Central African
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Kenya, Russia; see whc.unesco.org).
Overall, international organizations appear to be quite involved in forest issues. FAO
has an important forestry department and focuses its work on the economic side of forest
issues. UNEP considers the environmental side of forest issues. CIFOR is an international
research center on forest issues, such as poverty and illegal logging. Nevertheless, even if
international organizations get involved in forest conservation and sustainable development,forest issues and deforestation remains an important and alarming environmental concern.
Thus many Non Governmental Organizations, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the earth,
act to protect forests and denunciate illegal logging and corruption. Moreover individual
citizens make a role for themselves, using their economic power to induce more responsible
environmental practices. Indeed, consumers are more and more informed of environmental
concerns and of marketing and economic practices. Thus they do feel involved and concerned
by the international environment. Two related political consumption practices have emerged
for the past few years. First, consumer boycotts are a commonly and frequently tool used
to induce better ﬁrm’s environmental practices. Second, ecological certiﬁcation is now an
important signal to consumers sensitive to their environment.
Concerning forest issues, in 2004, WALHI, the Indonesia’s largest environmental group,
and several other environmental groups, have called for a boycott of timber from Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore and China, countries where illegal logging plagues local development and
environmental indicators. Moreover, several eco-labels (SmartWood, Scientiﬁc Certiﬁcation
Systems, Certiﬁed Wood Products Council, Good Wood) certiﬁes that timber has been
harvested in a sustainable way.
Chapter 5 aims therefore at analyzing the impact of consumer boycotts on ﬁrms’ practices.
Consumer boycotts are considered as a war of attrition between a group of consumers and a
targeted ﬁrm. Environmentalist consumers refuse to consume the ﬁrm’s good as long as it is
produced with a polluting technology. The boycott is successful if the group of consumers is
able to remain longer in the conﬂict than the ﬁrm. Two kinds of characteristics determine
the outcome of the game. First, market structure is important. If the market is competitive,
it may be open to eco-labeling and certiﬁcation. Any ﬁrm may enter and provide the good
with a clean production. In this case, boycotting is less costly and the boycott success is
more likely. In contrast, if the ﬁrm is in a monopoly position, a good substitute is diﬃcult
to ﬁnd, the boycott is more costly and therefore less likely.
Second, demand structure and consumer preferences are important. The boycotting
group, i.e. the population concerned by the quality of the environment, needs to be quite
important, and composed of important consumers. Indeed, the aim of the boycott is to hurt
the ﬁrms proﬁt, which means that it should represent an important part of the ﬁrm demand.
A simple tradeoﬀ therefore describes the problem to which consumers are confronted: boycottby important consumers is very costly for the ﬁrm, but boycotting is very costly for those
consumers. Finally, coordination failures and free riding are important issues that may
jeopardize boycott successes. Overall, consumer boycotts are likely to be quite ineﬀective.
1.5 Future research
The contributions of this thesis open opportunities for future research. Two main orientations
are to be distinguished.
First, as mentioned quickly before, political consumption has become an important phe-
nomenon over the past few years, which completely changes the way citizens act and defend
their environmental and social convictions. Focusing on consumer boycotts, the last paper
of this thesis is a ﬁrst attempt to analyze this ”new way to save the world” (Mc Laughlin,
2004). However, several important issues of political consumption remain to be investigated.
First, consumer boycotts may be an important way to signal important issues to politicians.
Investigating which type of boycott oﬀers the best signalling window of opportunity seems to
be a crucial and interesting topic. Second, certiﬁcation and eco-labeling constitute another
important pattern of political consumption. Analyzing the patterns of eco-labels settings is
an important research gap. Indeed, considering how the label requisites are chosen and the
impact of this choice process on the environment and the market structure is a crucial ele-
ment to be understood. Finally, the two kinds of political consumption mentioned (consumer
boycotts and certiﬁcation) are closely related. Investigating more precisely the relationships
between consumer boycotts and the emergence of eco-labeling is crucial to understand more
precisely the global impact of political consumption.
Second, the ﬁrst paper of this thesis analyzes the land use choice process of poor agricul-
tural households when using forest products as insurance. This paper is applied theoretic,
and would beneﬁt a lot of being tested empirically. Indeed, while some papers investigate
empirically the choice process of the land use in developing countries, the analyze of the
insurance use of forest products, and more broadly the impact of risk on the land use choice
are still research to be undertaken.
Several environmental and forest issues are only mentioned and considered quickly in
this thesis, but would beneﬁt from a deeper and more precise analysis, such as the linksbetween election processes, economic power and forest allocation, or communities land-use
management. Finally, deforestation is responsible of about 20 % of total Co2 emissions.
Payment for forest conservation to mitigate climate change may therefore constitute an
interesting option to combine environmental protection with direct livelihood improvement
for communities living near tropical forests. This issue is therefore an important topic to be
considered for future research.2. AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION, FOREST PRODUCTS AS SAFETY
NETS, AND DEFORESTATION
Abstract
Incompleteness of insurance markets is a crucial weakness of developing countries. In this
context, the poor households of rural regions often exploit common property resources,
such as forests, as insurance in case of economics stress. The aim of this paper is to derive
the implications of this insurance use on the forest cover, and thus on deforestation. The
land-use choice between agricultural land and forest therefore resembles a portfolio
diversiﬁcation. However, I also show that this insurance strategy may lead to resource
over-exploitation and constitute a poverty trap.
Keywords: deforestation; household model; risk aversion; agricultural expansion; forest
products.
JEL classiﬁcation: D13; O12; O13; Q12; Q15; Q23.
2.1 Introduction
Insurance markets of rural regions in developing countries are often incomplete, if not non-
existent. This situation gives non-conventional insurance systems an important role. Among
these systems, common property resources (CPR) appear to have an important insurance
role. Several case studies have studied the insurance role of commonly held resources, such
as forests, commonly held lands or even ﬁsheries.
A particular activity is often used as a safety net 1: Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP)
extraction2. Populations of interest here are farming communities that rely on forest as a
1 Among other insurance mechanisms: inter-household solidarity, livestock...
2 The term ”non-timber forest product”encompasses all biological materials other than timber which are
extracted from forests for human use.supplementary source of income (Byron and Arnold, 1999). In case of bad agricultural crops,
the households extract NTFP from the forest in order to smooth their consumption.
The aim of this paper is to understand the impact of this insurance use of forest products
on the land-use choice. Indeed, agricultural expansion appears to be the most important
cause of deforestation. The share of deforestation related to agricultural expansion has been
estimated at at least 50 per cent (Myers, 1992; UNEP, 1992) and at 70 per cent in the
1990’s (UNEP, 2003). In Africa, which is the area with the highest deforestation rates in the
world, more than 50 per cent of the deforested zones were switched into small exploitations.
Simultaneously, agricultural development is an important tool for poverty alleviation and
long term development (World Bank; 2000). The consequences of this insurance role of
NTFP extraction on deforestation is thus an interesting issue and can be investigated with
farm household models - a priority for future research (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1998).
Some papers have studied the safety-net role of common property resources, such as
forests (Agarwal, 1991 ; Baland and Francois, 2004 ; Pattanayak and Sills, 2001), but they
do not consider the impact of this role on the land-use decision. However the households face
a trade-oﬀ between forest and agriculture. Agriculture can be a way to alleviate poverty,
but is a risky activity, while NTFP extraction has low poverty alleviation potential, but is a
useful tool to compensate for agricultural risk. This paper investigates therefore the impact
of the use of NTFP as safety nets on the household’s decision to increase their agricultural
land, and thus, to clear forests.
The safety-net use of NTFP extraction may take two forms, corresponding to two kinds
of risk-management strategies. First, the diversiﬁcation strategy is equivalent to a portfolio
analysis, because the households use NTFP extraction as a risk-free asset (Aldermann and
Paxson, 1994). Second, the coping strategy consists of extracting NTFP only when agricul-
tural output is too low, working as a ”natural”insurance mechanism. Therefore, the problem
for the local communities has both the characteristics of portfolio analysis and economics
of insurance. The paper focuses on the diversiﬁcation strategy. The household chooses ex
ante the share of land dedicated to agriculture and the share of land dedicated to NTFP
extraction. The analysis of a coping strategy would induce a diﬀerent timing of the land-use
choice and the allocation of labor.To investigate the impact of the use of NTFP as a risk-management strategy, we build
on Angelsen (1999). Our extension allows for agricultural crops uncertainty and for NTFP
extraction, neither of which is considered in Angelsen (1999). Thus the model is an expected
utility maximization process of a risk-averse household which uses forest products to face
agricultural crops uncertainty. We assume a community that does not have access to insur-
ance nor credit market, so that the risk-management use of forest products is the only way
to deal with crop risks.
In this context, the comparative statics show that risk reduction, lower risk aversion and
larger population may be important factors of deforestation. Moreover, forest proﬁtability
is unambiguously positively correlated with the forest cover.
Angelsen and Wunder (2003) notes that this activity can constitute a poverty trap for
poorer households. Azariadis and Stachuski (in Aghion and Durlauf, 2006) deﬁne a poverty
trap as a ”self reinforcing mechanism which causes poverty to persist”. Thus determining
the conditions under which a CPR constitutes both a safety net and a poverty trap is also
an important issue. I deﬁne a poverty trap as a situation in which households cannot get
more than their subsistence requirement from their activities. In the case considered here,
households are ”trapped”in CPR extraction activity because of their need of insurance, which
keeps them away from other development opportunities. CPR extraction can constitute a
poverty trap as a result of a tragedy-of-the-commons process. Too much households are
in need of insurance and the resource cannot provide enough to properly insure all the
population. They face thus the classic poverty-environment nexus, where poor people depend
too much of their environment and overuse it.
Section 2 gives a brief review of the literature, emphasizing the use of NTFP for poor
agricultural households, describing the economics of land-use in agricultural areas and the
insurance properties of common property resources. Section 3 presents a household model
of land-use choice with risk on agricultural output and NTFP extraction used as safety net.
Section 4 shows how a CPR may constitute both a safety net and a poverty trap. Finally
section 5 concludes and discusses the policy implications.2.2 Review of the literature
2.2.1 The safety-net use of non-timber forest products
In developing countries, about 1.2 billion people rely on agroforestry farming systems that
help to sustain agricultural productivity and generate income (World Bank, 2001). The
risk-management role of forest products is particularly important in the rural regions of
developing countries, given that agricultural crops face many types of risk, such as price
shocks, seasonal ﬂooding, unpredictable soil quality, pests, crop diseases or illnesses. NTFP
c a nb eu s e dd i r e c t l yi nc o n s u m p t i o no rs o l dt oﬁ ll cash gaps. Formally, rural households,
which have limited credit and insurance options, choose a diversiﬁcation of their activities
(thus of the land use), in order to reduce aggregate risk (Morduch, 1995; Godoy et al., 1998).
Some studies analyze this use of NTFP (Baland and Francois, 2004; Pattanayak and Sills,
2001). One of the results is that any individual is more likely to visit the forest if the crops
are more risky or if he faces a negative shock. Godoy et al. (2000), in a study in Honduras,
argue that although NTFP extraction has a low annual value, it can provide insurance in
the case of unexpected losses. This risk-management role can be particularly important in
the case of common risk, because intra-village credit or insurance systems are more diﬃcult
to implement (Dercon, 2002).
Two risk-management strategies may be implemented (Angelsen and Wunder, 2002). The
diversiﬁcation strategy (usually observed in Latin America) is a classic risk-management tool
(Aldermann and Paxson, 1994). The household raises ex ante the number of its activities,
choosing if possible activities that have low covariance. In contrast, the coping strategy
(observed in Africa) consists of extracting NTFP only in the case of bad agricultural crops.
The use of NTFP can here be considered as an ex post gap ﬁlling use. Forest products are
extracted in order to smooth the household’s consumption in case of low crop returns.
In these two risk-management approaches, NTFP extraction appears to be eﬃcient for
poor rural households. First, a large variety of NTFP can be extracted, thus raising the di-
versiﬁcation of activities. Several studies mention fuel, fodder, ﬁbres, oil seeds, edible fruits,
staple foods, vegetables, spices, rope, leaf-plates, medicinal plants, vines, honey, sap, Brazil-
ian nuts, fruits bark and rubber (Kumar (2002), for rural India; Pattanayak and Sills (2001),
for the Tapajos National Forest, Brazilian Amazon). Second, many NTFP do not havestrong positive correlation among themselves or with agricultural output (Pattayanak and
Sills, 2001), so that they can be eﬃcient risk-management instruments. A bad agricultural
output is not necessarily linked to bad forest product quantities.
Two characteristics of NTFP are important to note. First, there are low capital and skills
requirements to NTFP extraction as well as open or semi-open access to the resource, so
that poor households can easily extract the resource. Neumann and Hirsch (2000) argue that
the poorest people are those who are the most engaged in NTFP extraction. Second, NTFP
habitually have low return to labor, so that they have poor potential to alleviate poverty
(Wunder, 2001; Angelsen and Wunder, 2002). Studying Bagyeli and Bantu communities
in South Cameroon, Van Dijk (in Ros-Tonen and Wiersum (2003)) gives an illustration of
the relatively low share of NTFP in total income -which argues for the risk-management
strategies- and of the link between poverty and NTFP use.
Hence, forests are competing for the land-use, with agriculture representing the most
important alternative. Indeed, forest products have a low potential of poverty alleviation,
but can be used to compensate shortfalls in agricultural yields. Conversely, agricultural
crops is a potential way out of poverty for households, but may represent a high levels of
risk, especially if the households have low access to insurance or credit markets. The trade-oﬀ
between these two land-uses is a major choice for poor rural households, and is a potentially
driving force of deforestation. An interesting topic is thus to analyze the land-use choice
process of the households.
2.2.2 The land-use choice literature and NTFP extraction
Among the papers studying the land-use choice by rural communities, only few take into
account the forest products use, and none study the risk-management use described here.
Lopez (1998) notes the coexistence in most developing countries of private lands, intended
for agricultural crops, and common property lands, namely forests, used for their products.
In his paper, the two land-uses compete with each other, but forest products extraction is
not a risk-management strategy. Speciﬁcally, Lopez analyzes the consequences of agricultural
intensiﬁcation and farm productivity improvement programs on the pressures on the common
resource. The main factor determining the programs’ impact on pressure on the common
resource is the factor-intensity of the crops. If crops are labor-intensive, then a rise in theirprices is likely to diminish the pressure on the common resource. However, if crops are
land-intensive, the pressure is likely to rise with the commodity prices.
Parks et al. (1998) study the competing land-uses, mainly agriculture, timber and non-
timber forest products. The paper distinguishes four cases, depending on the relative produc-
tivity of the diﬀerent activities: joint management of forests, forest preservation, conversion
to non-forest use, and forest abandonment. These four cases depend mainly on the impact
of the age of the trees and the management eﬀort on a proﬁt maximization function.
2.2.3 Common property resources as safety net
The literature on land-use choice discussed above ignores the safety-net role that forests
have when they are commonly held. Another part of the literature does, however, argue the
importance of common property resources (CPR) as safety net. Baland and Francois (2005)
analyze the insurance property of CPR, and compare it with the increased eﬃciency if this
resource is privatized. In their paper, each household has the choice between two activities:
CPR extraction and a private project. CPR extraction requires low skilled labor, which
implies homogenous returns to labor. The private projects provide heterogenous returns,
depending on the households skills. Therefore, CPR extraction represents for low skilled
households an outside option to private project, while the most skilled households allocate
their labor to the private projects. The authors found a potential negative impact of the
privatization of the resource on the welfare of the community’s poorest members.
Pattanayak and Sills (2001) ﬁnd that NTFP collection is positively correlated with agri-
cultural shortfall and expected agricultural risk. According to Bromley and Chavas (1989),
non-exclusive property rights can be seen as an integral part of risk sharing. In this case, the
common forest can be considered as an asset of last resort (Baland and Francois, 2005). A
strong link between poor people and CPR is often underlined. Dasgupta and Maler (1993)
argue that local commons provide the rural poor with partial protection in time of unusual
economic stress. A study of tribal groups in rural Bihar qualiﬁes communally-held forests as
the only means of survival for poorer members in lean seasons (Agrawal, 1991). Reddy and
Chahravaty (1999) observe in India a more intensive use of the CPR by poor households.
Dasgupta (1987) notes a higher level of CPR products in low labor productivity regions.
Johda (1986) ﬁnds a negative relationship between CPR income and rural inequalities.Although some papers study the competing land-use relationship between agriculture and
forests, none of them investigate the safety-net use of forest products to insure against crops
risk. In contrast, papers studying the safety-net role of CPR treat the share private/common
land as exogenous. The aim of this paper is thus to reconcile these two sides of the literature,
investigating the role of the safety-net use of NTFP on the land-use choice.
2.3 Diversiﬁcation strategy, risk-aversion and household’s optimal land-use
The model presented is an adaptation from Angelsen (1999). In contrast to Angelsen’s set-
up, agricultural output is uncertain and forest provides NTFP that are used to smooth the
household’s consumption when the agricultural output is bad.
The set-up for the land: The model represents a village economy. The total area of the
village is normalized to 1. We assume here only two possible uses for the land: agriculture
and forests. Both agricultural and forested areas are assumed to have the same quality. In
contrast to Angelsen (1999), we assume that forests provide Non-Timber Forest Products
(NTFP). We assume for simplicity an egalitarian repartition of the land across the households
in the village. Therefore, we consider a representative household, which has a share
1
N of the
total area of the village (N is the number of households in the village and is our indicator
of population pressure), which is equivalent to a share
1
N of total forest product extraction.
We avoid thus the tragedy of the commons problem, i.e competition between households for
the forest products. We also assume that both the agricultural good and the forest product
are homogenous. For both goods, land and labor are the only inputs. We assume that the
household uses an optimal combination of labor in the production process. Thus the labor
side is not explicitly considered here. The implicit assumption is that the household’s labor
force is entirely used and that the household may eventually hire outside labor 3.
R is the share of agricultural land in the village area (0 ≤ R ≤ 1). Agricultural land
area used by the household is thus deﬁned as R
N and forest land area for the representative
household use is 1−R
N . R is an indicator of the agricultural land cover and the choice variable
of the household. At the beginning of the period, the household chooses the share of the
3 For an analysis of the interactions between labor market and deforestation, see Bluﬀstone (1995).land it will cultivate. If R = 1, all the land around the village is converted to agriculture and
deforestation is maximized in the village area. If R = 0, forest conservation is maximized
and there is no agriculture. Between these two extreme cases, there is a trade-oﬀ between
the two possible uses of the land.
The safety-net use of forest products: We focus here on the diversiﬁcation strategy, i.e. the
land-use choice (inducing the labor allocation) is made ex ante. We assume that agricultural
land is, on average, more proﬁtable than forest land, but agricultural production is more
volatile than NTFP. Thus, there is a trade-oﬀ between a relatively more proﬁtable but riskier
activity - agriculture - and a relatively less proﬁtable but safer activity - NTFP extraction. In
contrast to Angelsen (1999), the agricultural output is not certain. The risk on agricultural
crops is supposed to be systemic. Therefore every household in the village lives in the same
state of the world. Thus there cannot be inter-household insurance.
There are two states of the world. In the good state, which occurs with probability δ,t h e




[Rx +( 1− R)f] (2.1)
where x is the optimal agricultural output (net of costs) per hectare in the good state of the
world. f is the quantity of forest products extracted per hectare, net of extraction costs. In
contrast to the agricultural output, f is assumed to be certain.




[Rx +( 1− R)f] (2.2)
x is the optimal agricultural output in the bad state of the world. Clearly x < x must
hold. Expected agricultural output per hectare is therefore:
E(x)=δx +( 1− δ)x (2.3)
Clearly, by assumption f<E (x), for otherwise there is no trade-oﬀ between the two
land-uses and all the land is used for forest product extraction.2.3.1 Expected utility maximization
The objective of the household is to maximize its expected utility. The household’s utility
function only depends on consumption: U = U(C), with
∂U
∂C > 0. A quick mean-variance
analysis may be done before considering the household’s optimal trade-oﬀ.
Mean-variance analysis: Both the expected level of consumption and its variance depend
on the share of agricultural land, R, to be chosen by the household.
The household can either consume directly what it produces or sell it to purchase other
goods. Thus we consider the equality between consumption and production as a budget








Expected consumption rises with the share of agricultural land, R, since expected agri-
cultural production is more eﬃcient than forest product extraction. Therefore, a risk-neutral
household would convert all the land into ﬁelds (R = 1) in order to maximize its expected









Clearly the variance of consumption is strictly increasing in R. Thus the choice in the
land-use is a trade-oﬀ between expected consumption and variance of consumption. The
relative weight given to the expected consumption and the variance will depend on its risk-
aversion: a risk-averse household gives more importance to the variance of consumption,
than a risk-neutral household.
Household’s objective and the optimal trade-oﬀ: We introduce a Constant Absolute Risk
Aversion (CARA) function, with α being the Arrow-Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion coeﬃcient:
U(C)=−exp[−αC] (2.5)
Expected utility is then:






∂R > 0i ff ≤ x. Therefore, we have a corner solution (R =1 )i ft h ef o r e s t
proﬁtability is lower than or equal to the agricultural proﬁtability in the bad state of the
world. In this framework, the safety-net use of the forest products only exists if the risk
on agricultural output is so high that NTFP extraction becomes the main activity of the
household in the bad state of the world. This condition is consistent with a portfolio analysis,
where the risk-free asset needs to be more proﬁtable than the risky asset in some states of
the world to have a positive share in the portfolio (Gollier, 2001). We now characterize










In this framework of risk on agricultural output, we deﬁne risk reduction as a rise in x and
af a l li nx, with a constant expected output E(x). This kind of risk reduction can be viewed
as the introduction of an insurance system. On the one hand, the household pays a risk
premium dx per hectare in the good state of the world. On the other hand, if the bad state
of the world occurs, the household receives as insurance dx per hectare. This risk reduction
deﬁnition implies (1 − δ)dx = −δdx,w i t hdx > 0.
Proposition 1 : When NTFP extraction is used as a diversiﬁcation strategy, risk re-
duction, lower risk aversion and larger population decrease the forest cover. Moreover, the
forest proﬁtability is positively correlated with the forest cover.





∂x ) > 0,
∂R∗
∂α < 0, ∂R∗
∂N > 0a n d∂R∗
∂f < 0.
Risk reduction has a positive impact on R. Hence, if the agricultural risk is reduced, the
safety-net use of NTFP is less important, agricultural land increases and forest cover declines.Intuitively, if the more proﬁtable activity becomes less risky - with the same expected prof-
itability -, its share in the agent’s portfolio raises. In our example, the introduction of an
insurance mechanism thus leads to more deforestation.
The Arrow-Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion coeﬃcient has a positive impact on the forest
cover. Intuitively, if the household is risk averse, it keeps more land as forest in order to insure
itself against crop risks, even if this is done at the expense of lower expected consumption.
The village population has a negative impact on the forest cover (positive impact on
R). Indeed, a larger population reduces the size allowed to each household. Each household
therefore raises the share of the most proﬁtable activity.
Consistently with a portfolio analysis, the portfolio share of the risk-free asset, i.e. NTFP
extraction, is positively correlated with its proﬁtability. A rise in forest proﬁtability could
come, for example, from a rise in the NTFP prices. A policy frequently advocated to reduce
tropical deforestation is the introduction of green labeling for NTFP in order to raise the
proﬁtability of the forests. Appendix C provides a numerical example of the coping and
diversiﬁcation strategies.
The precedent proposition ignores the fact that NTFP extraction from a common prop-
erty or free access forest can constitute a poverty trap, as an extreme case of a tragedy-of-
the-commons process. This case is studied in the next section.
2.4 Safety-net or poverty trap?
In this section, we build on Baland and Francois (2005). The share of agricultural land (R)
is now supposed to be ﬁxed, and not a choice variable anymore. The choice variable is now
the allocation of labor between the two activities. Moreover, the households are supposed
to have diﬀerent productivity on the agricultural land. We distinguish therefore skilled
and unskilled households. In contrast to the precedent section and because of household
heterogeneity, only unskilled households allocate some labor to CPR extraction.
The N households of the community allocate their unit of labor (Li = 1) between two
activities. First, labor can be allocated to a private project (e.g: private agriculture). Second,
it can be allocated to CPR extraction (e.g: NTFP extraction). In Baland and Francois, thehousehold allocate all its labor to one activity. In contrast, in the following model, each
household can divide its labor supply and allocate a share to both activities.
Baland and Francois consider successively a risk-free private project with heterogeneous
returns, and a risky private project with homogeneous returns. Conversely, we consider here
a risky private project with heterogeneous returns, while the CPR provides safe and homo-
geneous returns. Therefore, CPR extraction may have two motivations. First, households
have diﬀerent expected returns on their private project and the less skilled households allo-
cate all their labor to CPR extraction, and the CPR returns represent the minimum income
of the community. Second, the households face also diﬀerent levels of risk on their private
projects and allocate thus a share of their labor supply to CPR extraction in order to insure
themselves (note here that we assume the extreme case of no outside insurance possibili-
ties). Whereas Baland and Francois consider separately those two kinds of heterogeneity,
the model presented here study the possible poverty-trap implications of the coexistence of
these two role of the CPR: minimum income and insurance.
2.4.1 NTFP extraction as insurance and households heterogeneity
As in Baland and Francois (2005), we assume that all labor allocated to the CPR is equiv-
alently productive and receives the average product:
f(L).li
L ,w i t hli ∈ [0,1] the amount of
labor allocated to the CPR by household i and L =
  1
N li di the aggregate amount of labor
allocated to the commons 4. The commons production function, f(L), is strictly increasing
and concave in L. Therefore, the average product is decreasing in L, which constitutes a
tragedy-of-the-commons eﬀect: labor allocated by one household has a negative externality
on the other households. Moreover, total labor allocated to the commons can be an indicator
of environmental damages. Indeed, the overuse of a resource coincides with the degradation
of the ecosystem. Note here that we assume that the CPR is de facto open access, and that
no joint management strategy is implemented to induce sustainable use.
As already said, the private projects provide uncertain returns 5. The expected private
project return of household i is E(xi).(1−li). In the worst case, the private project provides
4 Note here that the size of the CPR is ﬁxed, and therefore not a choice variable.
5 A ﬁrst-best outcome would therefore come from the introduction of an eﬃcient insurance market that
eliminate risk on the private project.xi.(1 − li). Note here that only E(xi)a n dxi (and not the whole distribution of the private
project returns) are needed to describe the households characteristics. We restrict ourselves
to the case of common risk, i.e. we deﬁne: xi = E(xi) − C. Where C is the same across
households. Expected returns, E(x), and minimum returns, x, constitute a representation
of the households heterogeneity in terms of skills and risk, respectively.
The households are sorted according to the expected return on their private project.
Household 1 has the lowest expected return and household N has the highest one.
Household’s objective: At the beginning of the period, each household chooses its labor







Moreover, the households need to insure a minimum consumption requirement Cmin in
the worst state of the world (i.e if xi occurs). We assume here that the minimum requirement
is the same across the population. We consider basic needs to survive, such as nutrition. If
this requirement is not met, concerned households cannot stay in the community and have
therefore to migrate. Migration is therefore considered here as an action of last resort if the
environment cannot insure their livelihood to some households. An important concern here
is whether migration provides the minimum requirement to migrating households. Indeed,
migrating is by itself a risky behavior. This concern is not explicitly considered here. The
important point is that some households have to migrate simply because their livelihood is
threatened.




Mi =1if (1 − li).xi + li
f(L)
L <C min




Thus households are risk neutral, as long as they get their minimum requirement, and
are inﬁnitely risk averse under that point. We deﬁne as poor a household not getting more
than its subsistence requirement: it cannot get more from its activities than what it needs
to survive. This set up is somehow unfamiliar, but seems to ﬁt with the reality of many
poor communities of developing countries. Indeed, the main objective of poor householdsis likely to insure livelihood. Thus, it seems fair to assume that, in very poor communities,
households ﬁrst insure their livelihood, and then try to maximize their expected payoﬀ.
Two kinds of households decide not to migrate. First, private projects may be proﬁtable
enough for some households, even in the worst state of the world: xi ≥ Cmin. These house-
holds are naturally insured. Second, households properly insured by CPR extraction also
decide not to migrate. Thus CPR extraction needs to be proﬁtable enough to insure the
households properly, and the households need to allocate a minimum amount of labor to the











Return to CPR extraction is decreasing in total labor allocated. Thus, if too much labor
is allocated to the CPR, the average product goes down to its bottom value Cmin. Therefore,





If too many households are in need of insurance, the insurance capacity of the resource,
Lmax, may be too small. At this point, some households have to migrate and migration occurs
until the point at which every remaining household is insured, with the average return being
equal to the minimum requirement. Migration is considered here as an action of last resort:
the environment cannot provide to the households their livelihood, thus they have to leave.
Households are therefore assumed to migrate from the area if and only if they cannot get their





Midi = S − Lmax (2.13)
w i t hSt h ep o p u l a t i o ni nn e e do fi n s u r a n c e :
S : xS = Cmin (2.14)
At equilibrium, three classes of households can be distinguished, related to their labor
allocation.2.4.2 Classes of households at equilibrium
The equilibrium is a combination of a total amount of labor allocated to the commons, Lc,a
share of labor allocated to the commons by each household, li, and a number of households
that have to migrate, M.
At equilibrium, 3 classes of households can be distinguished according to the households
allocation of labor. Two classes are in need of insurance and therefore allocate a share of
their labor to CPR extraction, while the third one is ”naturally”insured.
Unskilled households: The less skilled households have an expected return on the private
project smaller or equal to the average product on the CPR. These households allocate all
their labor to the CPR. Therefore they get the average product.
For i∈ [0;U]:

      










The motivation for CPR extraction here is a lack of better opportunity. Less skilled
households rely on this activity because it requires low skilled labor and provides higher
returns than their private projects.
Skilled households: The most skilled households are those who get at least their minimum
requirement from their private project. Moreover, the expected return on their private
project must be greater than the average product on the CPR. Thus they allocate all their
labor to the private project. Their expected income is the expected private return.
For i∈ [S;N]:

      








This class of household can be considered as ”naturally”insured: they always get enough
returns from their private project to satisfy their basic needs.Middle class: This last class of household does not appear in Baland and Francois. For this
class, the private project is in expectation more proﬁtable than CPR extraction. However,
there are some states of the world in which this private project does not provide their
minimum requirement. Therefore they put some labor in CPR extraction in order to insure
themselves. Because the expected private project return is greater than the return on CPR
extraction, these households allocate labor on the CPR in order to get exactly their minimum
requirement in the worst state of the world.
For i∈ [U;S]:

      











Lc +( 1− li).E(xi)
(2.17)
While in a world with perfect insurance, these middle-class households would allocate all
their labor to the private project and get its expected return, they need here to extract from
the CPR in order to insure themselves, at the expense of reducing their expected return.
Note here that S represents the population in need of insurance (unskilled and middle class).
The following table synthesizes the patterns of the diﬀerent classes in equilibrium.
Unskilled Middle Skilled






θi <C min ≥ Cmin





Lc +( 1− li).E(xi) E(xi)
In order to show how CPR extraction becomes a poverty trap, we need to determine
what is the total amount of labor in the CPR.
2.4.3 Total amount of labor in the CPR
Only two classes of household allocate labor to CPR extraction: the unskilled and the middle
class. First, the unskilled households allocate all their labor to the CPR. Note here that the























S : xS = Cmin
(2.19)
S therefore represents the population in need of insurance. The size of the population
in need of insurance is independent of the total amount of labor allocated to the CPR.
However, the total amount Lc inﬂuences the repartition between unskilled and middle-class
households.
CPR extraction constitutes a poverty trap if the average product of CPR extraction go
below the minimum requirement. In this case, CPR extraction cannot properly insure the
households. This situation occurs if too much labor is allocated to the CPR: L>L max.
In that case, both poor and middle-class households cannot get more than their minimum
requirement and allocate all their labor to CPR extraction. Moreover, M households have
to migrate until the average return
f(Lc)
Lc equals the minimum requirement Cmin.
Thus, if CPR extraction does not constitute a poverty trap, the equilibrium amount of
labor allocated to the CPR is: 
   








Note here that the total amount of labor allocated to the CPR in the non-poverty-trap
case is a ﬁxed point of which the existence needs to be proven (see appendix C).
The equilibrium amount of labor allocated to the CPR in the poverty trap case is:

   




M = S − Lmax
(2.21)
At this point, it is possible to describe the two types of situation.2.4.4 Tragedy of the commons and poverty trap
It is well known that an open-access resource suﬀers of a tragedy of the commons: individuals
do not take into account the negative externality of their actions on the others. In the case
studied here, with CPR used as insurance, this phenomenon may lead to a poverty trap:
the population in need of insurance (unskilled and middle class households) is trapped in
CPR extraction and cannot get more than their minimum requirement. Moreover, some
households have to migrate.
Insurance without poverty trap: We consider here the case where: Lc ≥ Lmax. Therefore,
the insurance use of the CPR does not lead to a poverty trap. Nevertheless, CPR extraction
is characterized by a tragedy-of-the-commons process. Note for example that both unskilled
and middle class households would be better oﬀ with an insurance scheme. Indeed, middle
class households could allocate all their labor to their private project, which is more proﬁtable
in expectation. Moreover, the unskilled households would be better oﬀ too, because the labor
supply allocated to the commons and thus the tragedy-of-the-commons eﬀect would be lower.










Lmax Lc S U
Fig. 2.1: Insurance with no poverty trap and common risk
Insurance with poverty trap The poverty-trap case is a result of: S>L c = Lmax.M o r e
precisely, it is essentially an extreme consequence of the tragedy of the commons described
before. As already showed, M households have to migrate until the point at which the av-
erage product of CPR extraction reach the minimum requirement. At this point, middle
class households have to allocate all their labor to the CPR in order to insure themselves.
Therefore, both unskilled and middle class households are perfectly insured but cannot get
more than their minimum requirement, which constitute a poverty trap (as deﬁned in intro-
duction). Figure 2 describes the poverty trap case. Note here that skilled households get the











Fig. 2.2: Insurance with poverty trap and common risk
The causes of the poverty trap: A poverty trap is therefore the result of two main factors.
First, population factors are important. If the population in need of insurance (S)i sb i g ,
the poverty trap case is more likely. The size of this population is a consequence of two
components: distribution of skills (E(x)) and distribution of risk (x). Firstly, the bigger is
the population with relatively high expected return on the private proﬁt, the smaller is the
unskilled population. Secondly, the smaller is the risk at which the households are exposed,
the bigger is the population that does not depend on the resource.
Second, the production function of the CPR determines the threshold of population
(Lmax) that could exploit it. If the environment is fragile, it is quickly saturated and the
threshold is low.
Proposition 2: In a context of risk on the private projects, such as agriculture, the
use of CPR extraction as insurance can lead to a poverty trap if the population in need of
insurance is too large and the resource has small capacity. Then, both unskilled and middleclass households are trapped in CPR extraction and cannot get more than their basic needs
in return.
Proof: A poverty trap situation is characterized by: Lc = Lmax. S determine the
equilibrium amount of labor allocated to the CPR (Lc), while the capacity of the resource
determine the production function, and thus the maximum amount of labor allocated to the
CPR (Lmax).
As already mentioned, the poverty-trap situation is an extreme case of a tragedy of the
commons. The only diﬀerence in terms of welfare between those two cases is the fact that
the middle class de facto disappears when CPR extraction becomes a poverty trap. Indeed,
middle class households can insure themselves only at the cost of allocating all their labor to
the CPR. They lose therefore all the extra return they could get from their private project.
Only two classes of households remain in the society: the unskilled and the skilled households.
Moreover, as shown in Baland and Francois (2005), privatization may not be a good solu-
tion in terms of welfare, since the improved eﬃciency may not compensate for the reduction
of the insurance properties of the CPR.
2.5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to investigate the safety-net function of forest products in the
economics of land-use change and deforestation. We analyze the trade-oﬀ between two
land-uses. Agriculture is more proﬁtable but is risky. In contrast, NTFP extraction is
less proﬁtable but is used to smooth consumption or to ﬁll some consumption gaps when
agricultural crops are bad.
The ﬁrst model presented ignores some important features of poor agricultural house-
holds, which open opportunities for future research. First, households may compete for
NTFP extraction if the forest is open access. The potential poverty-trap implications that
NTFP extraction may create must then be taken into account. Indeed, if the population
in need of safety net is large, and if the forest capacity is small, a tragedy-of-the-commons
process may trap the less skilled households into NTFP extraction and deprive them ofother development opportunities. The second model of the paper highlight this potential
implication.
Second, considering more explicitly labor market integration could point outside op-
portunities for households, that would reduce the safety-net role of NTFP extraction and
thus increase deforestation. Third, other types of risk-management could have several im-
plications on the land use. For example, agricultural households could use livestock as a
risk-management strategy, which could increase land clearing and deforestation. Fourth, the
statement of risk-free NTFP extraction should be moderated, because of the existence of risk
such as animal migration or price volatility. Finally, the two models presented are static,
while dynamic modeling could allow for accumulation as insurance.
However, although quite simple and not considering some important factors such as dy-
namic eﬀects or labor outside options, the model presented here stresses some important
implications. We predict that a reduction in crop risk may have a negative impact on forest
cover. Development policies often consider agricultural development as a priority. Moreover,
an important objective is to reduce risk on poor agricultural households’ income. There-
fore, to reduce this impact, risk reduction policies should be combined with environmental
and forest management policies. For example, payment for environmental services provided
by forests may be an interesting tool. Indeed this kind of payment may enhance forest
preservation and raise the ”proﬁtability”of forests.
Risk aversion of the household is positively correlated with forest cover. This result is
quite intuitive, since forest products are a tool to reduce risk. In the economic analysis,
households are typically more risk averse than entrepreneurs, generally risk neutral. Eco-
nomic development may raise through market integration the separability between the utility
and proﬁt maximizing process. Households may become less risk averse, which could have
a negative impact on forest cover. Moreover, market integration should provide to house-
holds new insurance and credit mechanisms, reducing the safety-net use of forest products
described in this paper. This kind of market integration can thus indirectly lead to more
deforestation.
Agricultural risk and the safety-net use of NTFP extraction is therefore an crucial issue
with important economic and environmental implications such as deforestation, poverty-trap
and degradation of commonly-held forests. Some empirical analysis of the relationships thatlink agricultural risk, poverty and deforestation could give interesting indications. Moreover,
a natural extension of this paper would be to allow for land-use and labor allocation to be
choice variables at the same time.
Finally a related issue is the study of potential conﬂicts of interest between local commu-
nities using the resource and forest loggers. In this context, corruption and lobbying powers
have an important role, that could lead, for the local communities, to the deprivation of the
resource.
Appendix A: comparative statics
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 : we take the ﬁrst derivatives of the optimal share of agricultural land
R∗ with respect to our variables of interest. We deﬁne a risk reduction as a rise in x and a











































] < 0 (2.25)
Appendix B: a numerical illustration
The values of the variables (table 1) are adapted from Angelsen (1995, 1999). They corre-
spond as far as possible to a household survey done in the Seberida district, Riau, Sumatra.
For the variables not corresponding to the survey (i.e δ, x, x,fa n dα), we use values corre-
sponding to the basic conditions of the model ((2.3), (2.2)).Tab. 2.1: Parameter values of the numerical simulation
Variable Symbol Initial value Adapted value
Total land area H 1932 1
Number of households N 82 0.042
Expected output in agriculture E(x) 500 0.26
Low level of output x n.a 0.15
High level of output x n.a 0.37
Forest products intensity f n.a 0.22
Probability of x δ n.a 0.5
Absolute Risk Aversion coeﬃcient α n.a 0.5
n.a : not available
Source: Angelsen (1995, 1999)
Tab. 2.2: Results of the numerical simulation
Change in parameters Diversiﬁcation
Initial situation Cf Table 2 0.29
Risk reduction x =0 .36 ; x =0 .16 0.36
Forest proﬁtability f =0 .2 0.47
f =0 .24 0.14
Risk aversion α =0 .3 0.48
α =0 .7 0.21Appendix C: Lc as a ﬁxed point
The total amount of labor allocated to the CPR in the non-poverty-trap case is a ﬁxed point.
First, we need to prove that U(Lc)+LM
c (Lc) is decreasing in Lc.
Note that U(Lc) is decreasing in Lc. Indeed the number of unskilled people is deﬁned as:
E(xU) ≤ Y (Lc)/Lc, which is decreasing in Lc by assumption.
Therefore, if Lc increases, some households pass from the unskilled class to the middle
class. Those households reduce the amount of labor allocated to the CPR. Indeed, the un-
skilled households allocate all their labor to the CPR, while middle-class households allocate
only a share of it.
Overall, an increase of Lc induces a reduction in labor allocated by the unskilled class,
which over-compensate the raise in labor allocated by the middle-class households. It follows
that the total amount of labor allocated to the CPR decreases.
Second, U(Lc)+LM
c (Lc) is positive, as the amount of labor allocated by insurance-seeking
households is necessarily positive. It follows that Lc = U(Lc)+LM
c (Lc)i saﬁ x e dp o i n t .3. FORESTRY SECTOR CONCENTRATION, CORRUPTION AND
FOREST OVER-EXPLOITATION
Abstract
This paper develops the analysis of the relationship between concentration of the forestry
sector, corruption and forest over-exploitation. Policy maker and bureaucratic corruption
are considered sequentially. Overall, the corrupt policy maker chooses a larger share of
forest to exploit and sets less stringent harvest quotas. Moreover, if the forestry sector is a
well-organized lobby, the policy maker sets a larger number of ﬁrms harvesting the forest
and smaller concessions, which increases the impact of bureaucratic corruption.
Keywords: corruption, concentration, forest exploitation.
JEL classiﬁcation: D73, Q23.
3.1 Introduction
Corruption is one of the main features behind deforestation and over-exploitation of natural
resources, especially in developing countries. Illegal logging represents more than 90 per cent
of logging in Indonesia (Dudley et al., 1995), 80 per cent in Brazil and 90 per cent in Cam-
bodia (Winbourne, 2002). However, several forms of corruption can be distinguished. An
important distinction is between policy maker and bureaucratic corruption (Rose-Ackerman,
1978; World Bank, 2000; Wilson and Damania, 2005). First, policy maker or ”grand” cor-
ruption consists of oﬀering bribes to the policy maker in order to inﬂuence his policy choices.
Second, bureaucratic or ”petty”corruption consists of paying bribes to bureaucrats to avoid
the consequences of a particular rule.
Wilson and Damania (2005) ﬁrst consider this two-scales corruption and analyze the
impact of political competition and corruption on environmental policy stringency. They
show that political competition increases the stringency of environmental policy, but that itsimpact is limited. Indeed, if judicial institutions are weak, an increase in political competition
may increase bureaucratic corruption, which limits the enforcement of environmental policy.
Moreover, political competition does not necessarily deter bureaucratic corruption.
We build on Wilson and Damania (2005) and study the occurrence of corruption at
diﬀerent levels of governments and its eﬀects on forest exploitation in developing countries.
We extend from Wilson and Damania in two directions. First, we allow for bureaucratic
and policy maker corruption to have diﬀerent objectives. Indeed, policy maker corruption
may take the form of logging companies paying bribes to the policy maker to increase the
size of the forest to exploit. For example, in Indonesia, logging concessions covering more
than half the country’s total forest area were awarded by former President Suharto, many of
them to his relatives and political allies (Global Forest Watch, World Resource Institute). In
1995, in Cambodia, the two prime ministers in power at that time gave concessions, contrary
to the law, for the remaining parts of tropical forest (Harris White, 1996). Conversely,
bureaucratic corruption may take the form of a logging ﬁrm bribing a bureaucrat so that
he underreports the logging volumes. We take the corruption objectives as given without
exploring their motivations1. In contrast, Wilson and Damania consider that both policy
maker and bureaucratic corruption have the same objective (namely reducing the impact of
an environmental tax).
Second, we study an incumbent government and analyze the impact of the forestry sector
concentration on corruption and the forest policy. In contrast, Wilson and Damania consider
the impact of corruption on the environmental policy in the context of political parties
competing for power.
An important pattern of forest management is the allocation of forest concessions to
logging companies. The policy maker is supposed to decide both the size of the forest to
exploit, the number of ﬁrms exploiting it and thus the concessions size. We consider that
the ﬁrms are price takers. Therefore, we take the number of ﬁrms exploiting the forest as
an indicator of the forestry sector concentration. An interesting question that has not been
addressed in the literature is thus to wonder which relationships may link the concentration
of the forestry sector with corruption and over-exploitation of the forest resources. Indeed,
1 For an overview of the corrupt and illegal activities in the forestry sector, see Contreras-Hermosilla
(2001) and Callister (1999)developing countries usually have limited means to ﬁght corruption. An increased knowledge
of the links between forestry sector’s concentration and corruption may provide some tool
to reduce the impact of corruption, or at least give an indication of the source and impact
of corruption on forests over-exploitation.
As mentioned before, addressing rigorously this relationship requires to precise which
type of corruption is considered. Of course, the two types of corruption are rarely observed
separately. Corruption is generally a systemic phenomenon. A corrupted policy maker often
coexists with a corrupted bureaucracy, and vice versa. Moreover, both kinds of corrup-
tion may interact. In this paper, policy maker and bureaucratic corruption are analyzed
sequentially, proceeding backward.
The ﬁrst part of the paper investigates the impact of the forestry sector concentration on
bureaucratic corruption and on forest over-exploitation, taking the forest policy as given. The
logging ﬁrms may be inspected by a bureaucrat they might be willing to bribe. Moreover, an
uncorrupt authority may audit both the ﬁrm and the bureaucrat to verify the enforcement
of the forest policy. Intuitively, two factors inﬂuence the link between concentration and the
impact of bureaucratic corruption. First, a large number of ﬁrms reduces the probability
for the ﬁrm to be inspected by the bureaucrat and audited by the authority. Therefore,
a large number of ﬁrms on the market decreases the expected penalty and is an incentive
not to respect the logging rules and to over-exploit the forest resources. Second, if the
marginal productivity of harvest decreases with the size of concessions, small concessions
also represent an incentive to over-exploit the forest. Considering previous studies, it appears
that smaller concessions may incite the logger to intensify its logging eﬀorts, and thus exceed
the logging limits. Overall it appears that a larger number of ﬁrms tends to increase forest
over-exploitation.
The second part presents a model of policy maker corruption, following Grossman and
Helpman (1994). The policy maker chooses the forest policy, which consists of the number
of harvesting ﬁrms, the size of the forest to exploit and the maximum harvest intensity. It
maximizes a weighted sum of social welfare and received bribes. The ﬁrms act as one lobby,
bribing the policy maker to increase the size of the forest to exploit. In this context, the policy
maker tends to increase the size of the exploited forest. Moreover, if the lobby has small
coordination costs, the policy maker chooses a larger number of ﬁrms to exploit the forestand sets less stringent maximum harvest intensity, in order to indirectly increase the received
bribe. The model presented supports therefore the concept of systemic corruption: the
corrupt policy maker sets a large number of ﬁrms, which increases the impact of bureaucratic
corruption.
3.2 Bureaucratic corruption and forestry sector concentration
The policy maker is assumed to have chosen the forest policy, which consists of the size of the
forest to exploit F, the number of ﬁrms exploiting the forest, N, and the maximum harvest
intensity, e. This last policy instrument can be considered as a quota 2. For example, it
can be the minimum rotation age, or a maximum amount of timber to log per hectare. We
proceed backward. F, N and e are considered as given by the ﬁrm. In the next section, the
choice process of the forest policy is described.
We assume that the logging ﬁrms have an interest not to respect the quota and to set
e>e, i.e a positive level of non-compliance v =( e − e) > 0. To verify that the quota is
respected, bureaucrats may inspect the logging ﬁrm. However, the means being limited, only
an u m b e rNc of ﬁrms can be inspected. Moreover, if the inspected ﬁrm does not respect the
harvest limit, it may oﬀer a bribe B to the bureaucrat, in order for him to declare that the
quota has been respected.
Finally, an independent uncorrupt authority is in charge of auditing both the bureaucrat
and the ﬁrm, to verify the enforcement of the forest policy. If both parties are convicted of
over-exploitation and corruption, the authority imposes some penalties (proportional to the
level of non-compliance) hf(v)a n dhb(v) to the ﬁrm and the bureaucrat, respectively. It is
assumed that: ∂hi/∂v > 0a n d∂2hi/∂v2 > 0, for i = f, b. The authority audits a share σ
of the inspected ﬁrms. Assuming such a kind of authority allows to consider diﬀerent cases
of anti-corruption policies. As an extreme case, the authority has no mean to audit ﬁrms:
σ = 0. As another extreme, the authority has full mean to ﬁght against corruption, and
audit every inspected ﬁrm: σ =1 .
2 The case of an environmental tax is addressed in Damania and Wilson (2005). The level of non-
compliance would then reduce the tax basis.Following the political economy literature, we assume that the parameters related to the
enforcement of forest policy (Nc, σ, hf(v)a n dhb(v)) are exogenous. Indeed, these variables
depend on the country’s resources, which are heavily constrained in developing countries.
Thus, although crucial in ﬁghting against corruption, these policy instruments are assumed
to be exogenous, mainly because of budget constraint. However, one could argue that ﬁnes
collected may ﬁnance the ﬁght against corruption. A next step to the analysis could therefore
be to make the corruption policy endogenous.
3.2.1 The ﬁrm-bureaucrat interaction
The Firm
Each of the N identical ﬁrms3 receives the right to exploit a concession of size s = F
N.H a r v e s t
and land-holding costs are integrated in the harvest function. Timber price is also integrated
in the net harvest function. Therefore, concentration does not represent here market power,
as the ﬁrms are price takers. Concentration is only addressed trough the impact of the
number of logging ﬁrms and the concessions size on corruption.
The net harvest function takes the form H(s;e), with standard properties4: He > 0,H ee <
0,H s > 0,H ss < 0. The number of ﬁrms and the size of the exploited forest determine the
concessions size, which implies: H(s;e)=H( F
N,e), HF = Hs
N > 0,H N = −FH s
N2 < 0,H FF =
Hss
N2 < 0,H NN = FH ss
N4 < 0.
It appears diﬃcult to have a clear idea of the link between the size of the concessions and
the marginal productivity of harvest (Hse). On one side, transport costs and the costs of
opening access (mainly the creation of roads) to the forest are probably positively correlated
with the size of the concession, which tend to decrease the marginal productivity of harvest.
On the other side, congestion should be more important in the case of small ﬁrms, which
would have the opposite impact on the marginal productivity of harvest.
Only few studies treat this issue. Ruiz Perez et al. (2005) ﬁnd a negative relationship
between the size of concessions and logging ratio in the Congo Basin. This suggests a
higher pressure on small concessions (and thus Hse < 0). Gray (2002) also describes small
concessions as an incentive for unsustainable logging. Although empirical evidence is rather
3 In reality, the coexistence of large and small ﬁrms exploiting the forest is usually observed.
4 The subscripts refer to ﬁrst and second derivatives.meagre, it seems that marginal productivity of harvest is negatively correlated with the size
of concessions: Hse < 0. Consequently, the number of logging ﬁrms increases the harvest




The ﬁrms have interest to exceed the cutting quota (i.e the maximum harvest intensity)
imposed by the policy maker. We do not consider explicitly the incentive to over-exploit
the forest. Short-term horizons (e.g: short-term concessions or political instability) or non-
internalization of externalities could represent incentives to exceed the logging limit. Indeed,
an inter-temporal proﬁt maximization would suggest that a ﬁrm would not over-exploit the
resource because of expected future lost. Unsustainable forest exploitation is nevertheless
frequently observed. We take these incentives as given and focus the analysis on their
consequences.
The ﬁrm may be inspected (with probability (Nc
N )), and possibly pay the bureaucrat a
bribe B. Moreover, with probability (σ
Nc
N ), the authority audits and the ﬁrm has to pay a
penalty hf(v).
Overall, the ﬁrm has to make two choices. First, it chooses whether to respect the
quota (set e = e) or not. Second, if the choice of cheating has been made and if the ﬁrm is
inspected, it has to choose whether to bribe the bureaucrat (and set e∗ > e) or to accept to
pay the ﬁne (and set e∗∗ > e). If choosing to pay a bribe, the ﬁrm still risks to be audited
by the independent authority (with probability σ) and pay the ﬁne anyway. The following
table summarizes the diﬀerent strategies and payoﬀs.
Not inspected Inspected Inspected by the bureaucrat
Not audited Audited by the authority
Probability (1 − Nc










Cheat/Pay the ﬁne H( F
N;e∗∗) H( F
N;e∗∗) − hf(e∗∗ − e) H( F
N;e∗∗) − hf(e∗∗ − e)
Cheat/ Bribe H( F
N;e∗) H( F
N;e∗) − B H( F
N;e∗) − [B + hf(e∗ − e)]





Pay the ﬁne if inspected: H( F
N;e∗∗) − Nc
N hf(e∗∗ − e)
Bribe the bureaucrat: H( F
N;e∗) − Nc
N [B + σhf(e∗ − e)]
The objective of the ﬁne is to enforce the logging quota and therefore deter incentives
to cheat. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that the ﬁne is set such that the cheat/pay-
the-ﬁne strategy is dominated by the respect strategy, which implies that the expected ﬁne

























∗ − e) ≡ B (3.2)
The cheat/bribe strategy is chosen if the expected bribe is cheap enough to compensate
for the potential ﬁne involved by the audit. B therefore represents the reservation value of
the bribe for the ﬁrm.
The ﬁrm’s expected net beneﬁt from the bribe is the expected payoﬀ from the cheat/bribe













When choosing the cheat/bribe strategy, the ﬁrm gets a larger net output H( F
N;e). Its
is inspected by the bureaucrat with probability Nc
N and pay a bribe B.M o r e o v e r , i t m a y
be convicted by the audit authority with probability Nc
N σ and pay a ﬁne hf(v). Finally, the
respect strategy provides a safe payoﬀ H( F
N;e).
The bureaucrat
The bureaucrat is risk-neutral and gets a wage w for each ﬁrm inspected. Assuming the
inspected ﬁrm did not respect the harvest quota and oﬀers a bribe, he may accept the oﬀerand be audited with probability σ. If he is convicted, he looses his wage and is imposed a
penalty hb(v). The bureaucrat has therefore to make a choice between two behaviors: to
refuse the bribe and to make the ﬁrm pay the ﬁne, or to accept it and to take the risk of
being punished. The payoﬀs related to each strategy in each case are given in the following
table.
Not audited Audited
Probability (1 − σ) σ
Refuse the bribe w w
Accept the bribe w + B B − hb(v)
The following ﬁgure shows the expected payoﬀs related to both strategies.
Bureaucrat
Refuse the bribe: w
Accept the bribe: (1 − σ)w + B − σhb(e∗ − e)
We consider the situation in which accepting the bribe is the dominant strategy, implying:
B>σ (w + h
b(e
∗ − e)) ≡ B (3.4)
Indeed, the bureaucrat accepts the bribe if it is larger than the expected loss of being
audited. B is therefore the reservation value of the bribe for the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat’s
net expected payoﬀ is therefore his expected payoﬀ of accepting the bribe, minus the payoﬀ
of refusing it:
Ψ
b =( 1− σ)w + B − σh
b(v) − w (3.5)
If he accepts the bribe B, the bureaucrat is audited with probability σ and pays a ﬁne
hb(v). Moreover, he only keeps his wage w with probability (1−σ) (i.e. if he is not audited).
Finally, the refuse strategy generates a safe payoﬀ of w.
3.2.2 Equilibrium harvest intensity and bribe
The process to the equilibrium could be described as a maximize-then-share-the-pie process.
First, the harvest intensity of the ﬁrm is set in order to maximize the joint payoﬀs of bothparties, taking N, F and e as given. Second, the ﬁrm and the bureaucrat share the surplus
through a Nash bargaining process.
Equilibrium harvest intensity
Following Wilson and Damania (2005), the equilibrium harvest intensity is set in order to




















The ﬁrst order condition is:







v] = 0 (3.7)
The ﬁrm’s optimal harvest intensity is implicitly given by equation (3.7). In equilibrium,
the ﬁrm’s actual intensity of harvest e∗(N,F,e,Nc,σ,h f
v,h b
v) is set such that the marginal
productivity of harvest equals the marginal expected penalty.
Considering the factors inﬂuencing the ﬁrm’s harvest intensity, the parameters related to
the control of the harvest volumes, σ,Nc,h f
v and hb
v, unsurprisingly induce a smaller harvest
intensity in equilibrium: e∗
x < 0, for x = σ,Nc,h f
v,h b
v. Controlling more intensively the ﬁrm
(and the bureaucrat) thus decreases the equilibrium harvest intensity.
The impact of the size of the exploited forest F on the equilibrium harvest intensity
depends on the impact of the concession size on the marginal productivity of harvest, assumed














Ceteris paribus, an increase in the size of the exploited forest decreases the harvest in-
tensity of the ﬁrms. In this context, it seems that there is a trade oﬀ between primary forest
preservation (through the size of the exploited forest) and over-exploitation of harvested
forest (through harvest intensity).
Finally, the harvest quota e has a positive impact on the eﬀective harvest intensity.


































v]. Two components determine this sign. First, a large number of ﬁrms
reduces the probability of being inspected by the bureaucrat and audited by the authority,
and thus reduces the expected marginal ﬁne. This smaller expected ﬁne is an incentive to
raise the harvest intensity and over-exploitation of the resource. Second, the impact of N on
the marginal productivity of harvest is important. Since an increase in the concessions size is
assumed to decrease the marginal productivity of harvest (Hse < 0), a large number of ﬁrms
tends to increase the harvest intensity (HNe > 0). Overall, a larger number of ﬁrms exploiting
the forest tends to increase the equilibrium harvest intensity and forest over-exploitation.
Equilibrium bribe
The equilibrium bribe is set trough a Nash bargaining process. Both parties are supposed
to have the same bargaining power, so that they share equally the beneﬁt of not respecting
the harvest quota. We consider here that the bargaining is successful. It implies that the
equilibrium bribe must respect the reservation values described in equations (3.2) and (3.4).
















;e)][−σw + B − σh
b(v)] (3.11)













;e)) + σw − σ(h
f(v) − h
b(v))] (3.12)
This equilibrium bribe must lie in between the reservation values of both parties [B,B],
which implies that the beneﬁt of not respecting the quota must exceed the global expected














The equilibrium bribe is consistent with Damania and Wilson (2005). First, in order
to insure that higher ﬁnes induce a decrease in the equilibrium bribe, we need to assume:hf >h b. Indeed, the punishment has to be more severe on the bribe giver. For otherwise,
a higher ﬁne on the recipient would incite the giver to raise the bribe to compensate for the
recipient’s expected ﬁne. This assumption is consistent with the conclusions emerging from
the literature (Mookherjee and Png, 1995; Basu et al., 1992). Second, the equilibrium bribe





if the quota is stringent with respect to the harvest function, the incentive to cheat is high.
Finally, the impact of the probability of being audited σ depends on what both agents have
to loose: if the bureaucrat has more to loose than the ﬁrm (w + hb(v) >h f(v)), the bribe is
increasing in σ and vice versa.
In contrast with Damania and Wilson (2005), the equilibrium bribe is positively correlated
with the agent’s wage. Indeed, the authors do not consider the wage as lost if the agent is
convicted. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the bureaucrat is deprived from
his wage if he is convicted of not enforcing the quota and being corrupt. Moreover, this
assumption provides the insight that a well-paid bureaucrat is more expensive to corrupt,
s i m p l yb e c a u s eh eh a sm o r et ol o s e .
Furthermore, the bribe reduces with the number of ﬁrms inspected by the bureaucrat Nc.
Indeed, Nc raises the probability of being inspected, and thus reduces the expected share of
extra-harvest got by the ﬁrm, which naturally reduces its incentive to cheat.





















While the ﬁrst part of the equation, (H( F
N;e∗) − H( F
N;e)), which corresponds to the





on the cross derivative of the harvest function Hse, assumed to be negative. Overall, even if
Hse is negative, it seems reasonable to assume that a large ﬁrm pays a higher bribe to the
bureaucrat.
3.3 Concentration and policy maker corruption
Proceeding backward, we analyze now the choice process of the forest policy (N, F and e).
The policy maker is assumed to choose ﬁrst the number of ﬁrms, and then the harvest quotaand the size of the exploited forest. The ﬁrms in the forestry sector act as one lobby, the
aim of which is to increase the size of the forest to exploit.
Note here that the lobby could also bribe the policy maker to set less stringent harvest
quota. Nevertheless, logging quotas (or other harvest limits) in most countries are often
set in order to insure sustainability. Indeed, unsustainable logging policy is hardly accepted
politically. The major concern in this context is the enforcement of the rules, through the
limitation of bureaucratic corruption. In contrast, policy maker corruption appears to be
more likely to increase the share of exploited forest (as well as to inﬂuence the process of
concessions allocation).
The total forest area is set to 1. Thus F is the share of the forest to be exploited, while
the share (1 − F) represents protected primary forest.
3.3.1 The ﬁrm-policy maker interaction
To address this issue, we build on Grossman and Helpman (1994). The policy maker’s




;e);(1 − F);e)+( 1− α)C(F) (3.15)
W is the social welfare function. It is increasing in the total harvested volumes. Moreover,
the social welfare function is increasing in the size of primary protected forests (1 − F)
(and thus decreasing in the size of exploited forest), because of the environmental services
provided, such as biodiversity conservation or hydrological beneﬁts. Finally the social welfare
function is decreasing in the harvest intensity, assimilated to environmental degradation
(biodiversity loss, erosion, wildlife habitat degradation): WH > 0, WF < 0 We < 0, WHH <
0, WFF < 0a n dWee < 0. (1 − α) is the degree of corruptibility of the policy maker and
C(F) is the bribe schedule oﬀered by the lobby to the policy maker.
The forestry sector acts as a lobby. Its payoﬀ is therefore the total harvested volumes of




;e) − (1 + λ(N))C(F) (3.16)
The eﬀect of N on the lobby coordination is captured by λ(N), which corresponds to
the coordination costs of the lobby and the costs due to free rider behaviors by the lobbymembers. This set up follows Laﬀont and Tirole (1991) and Fredriksson et al. (2004). It is
assumed that: λN > 0.
3.3.2 Equilibrium forest policy
The equilibrium consists of the size of exploited forest F, the harvest quota e and the number
of ﬁrms exploiting the forest N.
Equilibrium size of exploited forest
The conditions for equilibrium are consistent with the political economy literature: F max-
imizes both (i) G(F) and (ii) (G(F)+Π ( F)). The ﬁrst order conditions are:
(i) αWHHs + αWF +( 1− α)CF = 0 (3.17)





)+αWF = 0 (3.19)
Which gives implicitly the equilibrium size of exploited forest F.N o t eh e r et h a tam o r e
corrupt policy maker (with low α) tends unsurprisingly to put more weight on the harvest
volumes, which tends to increase the size of the exploited forest.
Impact of the number of ﬁrms on the equilibrium size of exploited forest: The impact of N
on F is given by:











N (αWH + 1−α
1+λ(N))+αWFF
(3.20)
The denominator of (3.20) is unambiguously negative. The sign of the equation is thus
the sign of the nominator. Two components can be distinguished. First, a larger number of
ﬁrms increases the coordination costs of the lobby, which tends to decrease the size of the
exploited forest. Second, when choosing F , the policy maker takes into account the impact
of the size of concessions on the total harvest. If the number of ﬁrm is large, the policy
maker tends to increase the size of the forest to exploit in order to increase the size of the
concessions. The nominator may thus be negative if the lobby is not well organized and has
large coordination costs.Equilibrium harvest quota and number of ﬁrms
Although the lobby only oﬀers a bribe to the policy maker in order to inﬂuence the size of
the exploited forest, corruption has an indirect impact on the equilibrium harvest quota and
number of ﬁrms. Indeed, both variables have an inﬂuence on the lobby’s proﬁt, and therefore
an impact on the bribe oﬀered. The ﬁrst order conditions of the policy maker’s objective
give:







)+( 1− α)CN = 0 (3.22)
Those two equations give implicitly the equilibrium harvest quota e and number of ﬁrms
N.
The choice of policies e and N has indirectly an impact on the equilibrium bribe. The
sign of this impact depends on the impact of the policy on the lobby proﬁts. First, an
increase in e increases unambiguously the lobby’s proﬁt, which represents an incentive for
the lobby to raise its bribe. Second, an increase in N raises the lobby’s proﬁt (and thus
increases the equilibrium bribe) only if the marginal coordination costs λN and the decrease
in productivity due to the size reduction Hs are small:
∂Π
∂e









Hs − λNC(F) (3.24)
Therefore, if the policy maker receives a bribe in order to increase the size of the
forest to exploit, it might at the same time set less stringent quota than an uncorrupt
policy maker, in order to increase the proﬁtability of the harvested forest, and thus
the equilibrium bribe. Moreover, if the lobby is well-organized and if the harvest vol-
umes do not increase too much with the size of the concessions, the policy maker is likely
to set a larger number of ﬁrm in the forestry sector, in order to increase the equilibrium bribe.
Proposition : If the lobby is well organized, with small coordination and transaction
costs, a larger number of ﬁrms exploiting the resource tends to increase the size of the ex-
ploited forest F. Moreover, a cascade eﬀect illustrate the impact of corruption in the forestrysector: even if the lobby only oﬀers a bribe to the policy maker for an increase in the size of
the forest to exploit, the policy maker tends also to set less stringent harvest quota in order
to increase the equilibrium bribe. Moreover, the policy maker chooses a larger number of
ﬁrms to exploit the forest, which tends to increase the lobby’s inﬂuence and the impact of
bureaucratic corruption.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of concentration of the forestry sector and corruption on
forest over-exploitation. Concentration is deﬁned here as the number of ﬁrms harvesting
the forest and the size of the concessions. Corruption may occur at diﬀerent scales of gov-
ernments. First, the exploiting ﬁrm may bribe the bureaucrat in charge of the harvest
inspection, so that he underreports the harvest volume. Second, the exploiting ﬁrms may
act as a lobby, and bribe the policy maker to increase the size of the forest to exploit.
In the ﬁrst case of bureaucratic corruption, a forestry sector composed of a large number
of small logging ﬁrms tends to increase the impact of corruption on forest over-exploitation.
Indeed, a large number of ﬁrms reduces the control capacity of the civil agency. More-
over, small concessions (i.e a large number of ﬁrms) appear to be an incentive for harvest
intensiﬁcation.
In the second case of policy maker corruption, a corrupt policy maker tends to set a
larger exploited forest. Moreover, if the lobby is well-organized, the policy maker sets a
larger number of ﬁrms exploiting the forest in order to increase the equilibrium bribe, which
in turn increases the lobby’s inﬂuence. Finally, less stringent harvest quota is set.
The model presented here supports the argument of systemic corruption. Overall, if the
forestry sector is well-organized, a corrupt policy maker chooses a large number of ﬁrms
exploiting the market, in order to increase the bribe he receives, which in turn increase
the impact of bureaucratic corruption. Therefore, the two kinds of corruption are likely to
be observed at the same time. Moreover, a cascade eﬀect might describe the environmental
degradation. First, the size of the harvested forest is larger than the social optimum. Second,
the harvest rules are less stringent than the social optimum. Finally, due to bureaucraticcorruption, those sub-optimal harvest rules are not even enforced. Overall, the size of the
primary protected forest decrease, and the harvested forest is over-exploited.
A crucial limitation of the model presented here is that ﬁrms and concessions are assumed
to be homogeneous in size. However, in real life, small and large ﬁrms often coexist. Thus it
could be interesting to consider the diﬀerence in corruption patterns between heterogeneous
ﬁrms. For example, small ﬁrms might choose to bribe bureaucrats, while large ﬁrms ﬁnd
more proﬁtable to bribe directly policy makers.
Moreover, a restrictive deﬁnition of concentration is used. Indeed, ﬁrms are assumed
to be price-takers whatever is the concentration of the forestry sector. It could be more
realistic to assume that ﬁrms have some market power in case of a concentrated forestry
sector. In that case, market power would increase the ﬁrm’s potential for bribing, which
would compensate for the propositions presented here. However, the fact that logging ﬁrms
from highly concentrated forestry sector of developing countries have strong market power
is not obvious and should be investigated.
Finally, the process of concessions allocation is not modeled explicitly in this paper. Nev-
ertheless, concessions allocation is an important pattern of corruption and forest exploitation
in developing countries. Indeed corrupt regimes often use these allocation process to reward
their political allies or to increase the wealth of their friends or family. In this context, con-
cessions would be given according to the number of these allies and their ”worthiness”, which
would determine the concessions size. Moreover, logging ﬁrms may compete for concessions
allocations. The links between concentration of the forestry sector and forest exploitation
w o u l di nt h a tc a s eb ed i ﬀ e r e n t .4. FORESTS AND THE RESOURCE CURSE HYPOTHESIS
Abstract
The resource curse hypothesis relies on the resource-rich countries tendency to grow slower
than resource-poor countries. Focusing on forest issues, this paper extends the resource
curse hypothesis to environmental degradation: how do forest and resource endowments
aﬀect deforestation? Countries with important forestry sectors seem to have deforested
more than countries with small forestry sectors, which supports the hypothesis of an
environmental resource curse. We also test whether forests constitute a resource curse,
using three diﬀerent forest indicators. While our stock indicators are not signiﬁcantly
related to growth, our ﬂow indicator is strongly negatively correlated with growth.
Keywords: resource curse, growth, tropical forest, deforestation.
JEL classiﬁcation: C21; O13; Q33.
4.1 Introduction
A well documented paradox in the economic development literature is the tendency of
resource-rich countries to grow slower than countries with less natural resources. Whereas a
conventional view would see endowments in oil, diamond, gas and other natural resources as a
blessing that gives the country an opportunity to create wealth and contribute to economic
development, many observations emphasize this resource curse hypothesis. For instance,
Nigeria, Venezuela, Sierra Leone or Angola, all countries with large natural endowments, are
among slow growth countries. In contrast, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore are resource
poor, but have experienced fast growth periods.
Researchers (Leite et al., 2002; Mehlun et al., 2006; Papyrakis et al., 2004; Sachs et al.,
1997, 1999) usually focus on growth to describe a resource curse. Bulte et al. (2005) ﬁnd ev-
idence of the resource curse for several human development indicators (Human DevelopmentIndicator, Undernourished population, Percentage of the population with no proper water
access, Life expectancy). However, important resource endowments may also constitute a
curse for the environment. Among diﬀerent environmental concerns, deforestation is inter-
esting to analyze. Indeed countries the most concerned by the resource curse are developing
countries. Therefore, it is interesting to test this environmental resource curse hypothesis
with an important environmental concern in the developing world, and deforestation is one of
the major environmental concerns in developing countries. Furthermore, forest endowments
constitute both a resource endowment and an environmental indicator. This allows us to
test the resource curse hypothesis in two directions. We investigate ﬁrst for an environmen-
tal resource curse for deforestation and then test whether forest endowments constitute a
resource curse.
This paper ﬁrst wonders whether important resource endowments also represent an en-
vironmental resource curse. Indeed important resource endowments may lead to poor insti-
tutions and policy making. Poorly developed institutions may lead in turn to unsustainable
environmental management, and thus more deforestation. Moreover, natural resources ex-
ploitation requires space, which creates incentives to land use change and thus deforestation.
For example, mining is a major cause of deforestation in many South-American countries.
We test for a direct environmental resource curse, considering the importance of the forestry
sector to GDP, and an indirect resource curse, using the share of primary products exports in
GNP. We ﬁnd evidence of a direct environmental resource curse, especially when controlling
for growth. Contrarily, we ﬁnd no evidence of an indirect resource curse. When controlling
for corruption, we even ﬁnd that countries rich in natural resources tend to deforest less than
countries with small resource endowments.
Second, we wonder whether forests constitute a resource curse. The usual resource curse
literature usually focuses on ﬂows (e.g: share of primary export in total export) to investigate
the resource curse hypothesis, which is closely related to resource exploitation: countries with
large resource endowments may have small resource ﬂows, because of a better diversiﬁcation
of activities. Focusing on forests allows to consider both ﬂows (or exploitation) and stocks
(or endowments). Indeed, we use three diﬀerent forest indicators. Stocks are approximated
through the size of the countries forests (or absolute endowment) and the proportion of
land area covered by forests (or relative endowment), while ﬂows are approximated throughthe volume of industrial roundwood produced divided by GDP (or exploitation indicator).
While our forest endowment indicators are not signiﬁcantly related to growth, our proxy
for the forestry sector’s importance is strongly and negatively related to growth, which
gives the insight that the resource curse is a result of bad economic management and over-
specialization.
Section 2 surveys the transmission channels of the resource curse, and mentions the
potential for an environmental resource curse. Section 3 investigates the existence of a
resource curse for deforestation. Section 4 tests the resource curse hypothesis, using three
diﬀerent forest endowment indicators and section 4 concludes.
4.2 Which factors drive the resource curse?
Three main groups of transmission channels are to distinguish: specialization perverse ef-
fects, rent-seeking behaviors and institutional development. The ﬁrst group underlines the
fact that large natural endowments may divert a country from activities the most able to
conduct to long term growth. This specialization into resource extraction activities is likely
to be detrimental to the country in the case of declining terms of trade between primary
resources and manufactured goods (Prebisch, 1950). Even if the Prebisch hypothesis ﬁnds
little empirical support, countries specialized in resource extraction beneﬁt less from manu-
facturing sector’s spillovers (positive externalities and increasing return to scale; Sachs and
Warner, 1999; Torvik, 2001). Finally, natural resource prices are usually quite volatile, which
increase investors uncertainty.
The second group underlines the importance of rent-seeking behaviors in resource-rich
countries. Indeed, resources are usually considered as easily appropriable, so that there are
large incentives for rent-seeking activities, such as bribes or lobbying. This ”voracity eﬀect”
(Mehlun et al., 2006b) constitute a diversion of labor and capital from more productive
activities. As an extreme case, natural resource appropriation may be a source of conﬂicts
or political violence. For instance, Olsson (2006) studies diamond exploitation and conﬂicts
between rebel groups and kleptocratic governments. However, all resource-rich countries do
not experience high levels of corruption. Most papers conclude that institutional background
is an important vector of the resource curse: administrations with low levels of corruptionreduce the incentive for rent-seeking activities and thus decrease the importance of this
transmission channel. Therefore, countries with well-developed institutions should be less
cursed and even blessed by resource endowments (Mehlun et al., 2006a, 2006b).
The third group refers to this institutional quality. Poor institutions may be a conse-
quence of resource wealth (Leite and Weidmann, 2002). Indeed natural resources represent
to governments ”easy money” that may lead to sloth in the development of institutional
quality and economic policies. Then low quality institutions lead to bad economic manage-
ment, poor decision making, bad or low investment decisions, unsustainable management
of the resource and thus jeopardize long term growth. Moreover, as already mentioned, it
oﬀers an incentive for corruption and other rent-seeking activities. Overall, large resource
endowments may inﬂuence institutional quality (Hall and Jone, 1999), which in turn reduces
growth and jeopardizes long term development.
In this context, several authors (Auti, 2001a, 2001b; Bulte et al., 2005) note that ”point”
resources, such as fuel and mineral resources are more easily appropriable than ”diﬀuse” re-
sources, such as agricultural resources or forests. Indeed, spacial concentration makes exclu-
sion from the resource, and thus appropriation, easier. This implies a greater concentration of
power, which oﬀers more scale for rent seeking and corrupted behaviors. Point resources are
therefore more likely to represent a resource curse than diﬀuse resources. When forests are
considered, rent seeking and institutional quality should therefore be less important factors
of the resource curse.
Environmental resource curse: The last two transmission channels considered are likely
to have strong relationship with environmental quality and especially deforestation issues.
Indeed, corruption and rent-seeking activities are a frequently cited factor of forest over-
exploitation in developing countries (Callister, 1999; Contreras-Hermosilla, 2001). More
generally, poor institutional quality is likely to induce poor policy making, which generates
unsustainable forest management. Overall, many empirical analysis ﬁnd that better institu-
tions reduce deforestation (Bhattarai and Hammig, 2001; Culas, 2006; Deacon, 1994; Nguyen
Van and Azomahou, 2006). Moreover, resource extraction and exploitation need space and
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Two types of environmental resource curse may be distinguished. First, a direct environ-
mental resource curse describes the negative impact of forests endowments and exploitation
on deforestation. Second, an indirect environmental resource curse would be the impact of
global resource endowments on the forest cover.
4.3 Is there a resource curse for deforestation?
4.3.1 Data and regressions
This section wonders whether deforestation may be a special type of resource curse. Indeed,
when looking at stylized facts, countries with important forest cover seem to deforest more
than countries with small forest cover. Figure 5.1 illustrate this relationship between per-
centage of land covered by forests and deforestation. Indeed, the value given to standing
forest is likely to be negatively correlated with the quantity of forest available. Deforestation
is therefore cheaper for a country with large forest endowments. Moreover, it appears that
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We regress therefore our deforestation proxy (Deforestation) on two indicators of natural
resource endowments (Ressource) and a vector of potential explanatory variables (H):
Deforestation










90 . We test for two types of environmental resource curse.
First, a direct resource curse is estimated, using industrial roundwood production (m3)d i -
vided by GDP, which is a proxy for the share of GDP provided by the forestry sector (Forest
Sector). This proxy is somehow tricky, but the FAO only provides roundwood production
data in volumes. The sign depends on the quality of forest exploitation. Sustainable forest
exploitation should have no or small impact on the forest cover, while unsustainable forest
exploitation should increase deforestation. Indeed, the FAO deﬁnition of the forest cover is:
Land spanning more than 0.5 hectares with trees higher than 5 meters and a canopy cover of
more than 10 percent. Forest exploitation leads to deforestation only if the cover decreases
to less than 10%. A direct environmental resource curse would therefore come from unsus-
tainable forest exploitation. Second, an indirect resource curse is estimated using the share
of primary products exports in National GNP for the year 1970 (PrimaryExports). Here,the environmental resource curse would come from road creation and bad environmental
management due to poor institutions.
Our ﬁrst control variable is a relative forest endowment indicator i.e. the proportion of
land area covered by forests (Forest Cover). Indeed, the relative value of standing forests
is likely to be smaller for countries with large forests endowments. Thus, a country with
an important forest cover is likely to deforest more than a country with small forest cover.
The second type of control variables approximate institutional quality. We use sequentially
the IRIS corruption (Corruption, low score means high corruption) and rule of law index
(Rule of Law). We expect a negative impact of corruption (positive impact of the index)
and a positive impact of the rule of law on the forest cover: rent-seeking behaviors and poor
institutions to appropriate forest resources are likely to increase deforestation. Third, we
consider the annual growth rate of GDP as a potential explanatory variable (growth).
4.3.2 Results
Results are presented in table 4.1. As expected, a negative robust correlation is established
between the forest cover and deforestation. Overall, countries with relatively important
forest cover have deforested more over the period considered than countries with small forest
cover. Deforestation also appears to be more important in countries with poorer institutions.
Unsurprisingly, corruption, rent-seeking behaviors and poor economic and environmental
management facilitate resource appropriation, limits law enforcement and thus favors land
appropriation and unsustainable forest use.
Considering our variable of interest, two main relationships need to be distinguished.
First, the regressions give some evidence of a direct environmental resource curse: countries
relying heavily on forest exploitation seem to have deforested more than countries with
small forestry sectors. Moreover, introducing the growth rate of GDP reinforces the negative
relationship between forestry sector’s importance and forest cover change. This result gives
the insight that forest exploitation is mainly non sustainable, since it leads to increased
deforestation. Second, we do not ﬁnd evidence of an indirect environmental resource curse.
Indeed, the coeﬃcients related to natural resource exports are at ﬁrst not signiﬁcant and
become strongly positive, when the corruption index is introduced in the regressions. 1




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Forest Cover 0.02*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(3.02) (3.37) (2.98) (4.46) (4.72) (3.63) (3.64)
Forest Sector 0.05* - 0.10** 0.11* 0.07 0.22*** 0.25***
(1.44) (1.66) (1.51) (0.98) (2.96) (3.43)
Primary Export - -0.12 -0.14 -0.46*** -0.54*** -0.67*** -0.67***
(0.9) (1.05) (-2.94) (-3.29) (-2.57) (-2.62)
Corruption - - - - 0.04*** - - -0.03**
(-3.59) (-2.28)
Rule Of Law - - - - -0.04*** -0.03** -
(-3.65) (-2.22)
Growth - - - - - - 0.03** -0.03**
(-1.9) (-1.86)
Constant -0.07*** -0.07** -0.09** 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(-2.84) (-1.79) (2.09) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.64)
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.09 0.1 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.37
N 189 110 108 80 80 73 73
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses.
* 10% level of signiﬁcance
** 5% level of signiﬁcance
*** 1% level of signiﬁcance
Corruption index: low score means high corruption4.4 Are forests a resource curse?
4.4.1 Data description
The resource curse literature usually considers the impact of resource exploitation on growth
and development (e.g: primary export intensity, share of mineral production in GDP, min-
eral production). The analysis therefore focuses on the resource curse for countries exploiting
intensively their resources. In contrast, countries may have important resource endowments,
but give priority to the diversiﬁcation of their activities. Focusing on forest resources allows
to distinguished the impacts of both endowments (or stocks) and exploitation (or ﬂows) on
growth. Indeed we use three diﬀerent forest indicators. Dotations are approximated through
the size (hectare) of the countries forests, or absolute endowments (Forest Area), and the
percentage of land covered by forests, or relative endowment (Forest Cover). Exploitation is
approximated through a proxy for the forests economic importance, using industrial round-
wood production (m3) divided by GDP (Forest Sector).
These three indicators (source: FAO) allow for considering forest endowments in diﬀerent
manners. Absolute forest endowments seem to be the most evident indicator, but is closely
related to the country’s total area, which is likely to have an impact on development. Relative
forest endowments are not directly related to the total area. Nevertheless, a large share
of land covered by forests may be a consequence of underdevelopment, and not a direct
cause. Finally, industrial roundwood production per unit of GDP is not a direct indicator
of forest endowments, but it indicates to what extend the country relies on this resource.
Unfortunately, there is no indicator giving information of forest biodiversity, which would be
an important factor to be considered in the analysis. Rapid graphical analysis tends to show
that forest cover and our proxy for the forestry sector’s importance are negatively correlated
with growth (ﬁgure (4.3) and (4.4)).
The other variables used in this section are those of Sachs and Warner (1997, 1999) and
are described in appendix A. The resource curse hypothesis assumes a negative relationship
between natural resource endowments and development. The development indicator we use
is the average annual per-capita growth in real GDP for the period 1979-90. Of course,
the growth of GDP is an imperfect estimator of development. Several other indicators
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Forest exploitation and growth(2005) test the resource curse hypothesis using diﬀerent indicators of human welfare: HDI,
undernourished population, access to water, life expectancy. Nevertheless, growth of GDP
is a commonly used indicator of economic development, which is in itself an important part
of human development.
Our estimations are based on the convergence hypothesis, i.e among several variables,
high-income countries tend to have lower growth rates than low-income countries. There-
fore, country i’s average annual growth rate of GDP per capita, gi, is assumed to be negatively
correlated with the log of its 1970 GDP per capita, ln(Y i
70). However, the use of the con-
vergence hypothesis has been criticized when applied to cross-country estimations. Indeed,
because it does not consider initial level of productivity, the coeﬃcient of lagged income is
likely to be overestimated (Islam, 1995). Panel data would be a solution to this problem.
Moreover, the resource curse hypothesis assumes a negative relationship between the
growth rate and forest indicators F i. Finally, a vector of other explanatory variables Zi
is considered. Those explanatory variables are the potential transmission channels of the
resource curse presented earlier. Perverse eﬀects of specialization are captured by the share
of manufacturing exports in total export (Manufacturing Sector). Rent-seeking activities,
corruption and more broadly institutions are captured by the corruption index (Corruption)
and the rule of law index (Rule of Law) presented before (source: IRIS). Finally, institutional
development is considered through economic openness (Openness), usually considered as a
proﬁtable economic policy, and the ratio of domestic investment to real GDP (Investment),
which is the result of proﬁtable policies.
Thus, for our three forest endowments indicators, we proceed to the estimation of (ε is
the usual error term):
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4.4.2 Results of the cross country regressions
The results can be found in table 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. For the three forest indicators, all the
habitual potential sources of growth have the expected sign and are highly signiﬁcative: the
convergence hypothesis is conﬁrmed; openness, manufacturing sector development, institu-tions and investment are positively correlated with growth, while corruption is negatively
correlated with growth.
Considering absolute forest endowment (table 4.2), the sign of the coeﬃcient is not the
one expected, but is not signiﬁcative. Indeed, while the resource curse hypothesis implies
a negative relationship between resource endowments and growth of GDP, the coeﬃcient
is positive. Moreover, it is robust to the addition of the potential transmission channels.
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, countries total forest area is not a perfect indicator of
forest endowments, simply because countries with large total areas naturally tend to have
larger forest area, which can be related to development to some extend. For example, the
USA have almost 300 thousands km2 of forests (32.6% of the country’s total area), while
Gabon only has about 20 thousands km2 (85.1% of the country’s total area).
Therefore we also test the resource curse hypothesis using a relative forest endowment
indicator (table 4.3). In contrast with the Forest Area indicator, the estimated coeﬃcient
using this Forest Cover indicator has the expected sign (negative), but is not signiﬁcant
either. Here again, the sign of the coeﬃcient is robust to the addition of the transmission
channels indicators. Overall, it seems that forest endowments are not signiﬁcantly related
to growth and development.
Forest endowments do not seem to constitute a resource curse. Considering forest ex-
ploitation, using a proxy for the forestry sector’s economic importance gives diﬀerent results
(table 4.4). Indeed, when considering industrial roundwood production per unit of GDP,
the estimated coeﬃcients have the expected negative sign and are highly signiﬁcative. This
result gives the insight that countries relying on forest exploitation tend to grow slower.
Moreover, this result is robust to the addition of the potential transmission channels.
Two potential explanations can be derived from this result. First, forest endowments
may not represent a resource curse, while relying on forest exploitation does. Among the
channels considered, we found that openness and investment are strongly negatively related
to our proxy for forestry sector’s importance (see table 4). More surprisingly, manufacturing
sector’s importance is strongly positively correlated to our proxy. Overall, however, this
resource curse could not be totally explained by the traditional transmission channels, since
their addition in the regression do not change the coeﬃcient much. In this case, if the forestexploitation is not related to growth trough the traditional transmission channels, why would
it be a resource curse?
A second explanation is that neither forest endowments nor forest exploitation represent a
resource curse. In that case, why would forest exploitation be negatively linked with growth
and development? A simple and quite intuitive answer would be that relying on forest
exploitation is more a consequence of under development than a cause. Indeed, countries with
low development opportunities are perhaps more likely to focus more on forest exploitation
than countries with more diverse opportunities. This statement is compatible with the
fact that countries relying on forest exploitation also tend to have smaller investment and
openness. This second potential explanation seems to be more convincing than the ﬁrst one.
Moreover, the forestry sector generally represents a small share of the countries GDP. In
2000, forestry sectors contributed for about 3% to 5% of GDP in Brazil, Guyana, Suriname,
Paraguay, Chile, Latvia, Estonia and some African countries. Overall, forestry sectors con-
tributed to 1.5% of GDP in Africa, 1.1% in Western Europe, 1.7% in Latin America and
1.2% worldwide (FAO, 2004). Thus interactions and behaviors related to the forestry sector
are unlikely to have large macroeconomic eﬀects. First, countries cannot totally specialize
in forest exploitation. Second, even if some corrupt behaviors or rent-seeking activities may
be enhanced by forest exploitation, they probably have too small impacts to be perceived
at the country level. Finally, forestry sectors importance is too small to limit signiﬁcatively
institutional development and the implementation of proper macroeconomic policies.Tab. 4.2: Growth regressions as in Eq(2), considering Forest Area
Dependent Variable: gi (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Y i
70) 0.16 -0.15 -1.11*** -1.4*** -1.25*** -1.51
(0.81) (-0.59) (-3.89) (-4.61) (4.73) (-5.56)
Forest Area 1.01e-06 1.63e-06 9.18e-07 1.05e-07 1.32e-06 1.21e-06
(0.38) (0.61) (0.42) (0.05) (0.66) (0.63)
Manufacturing Sector - 2.27*** 1.90*** 1.69*** 1.22* 1.42**
(3.02) (2.66) (2.41) (1.71) (2.08)
Corruption - - 0.55 - 0.28** 0.24**
(4.38) (2.17) (1.89)
Rule of Law - - - 0.64*** -
(4.97)
Openness - - - - 2.09*** 1.70***
(3.93) (3.20)
Investment - - - - - 1.11***
(2.62)
Constant -0.31 1.60 8.31*** 10.66*** 9.59*** 8.92***
(-0.19) (0.80) (3.79) (4.61) (4.75) (4.58)
Adjusted R2 0 0.08 0.31 0.35 0.44 0.49
N 103 92 72 72 70 70
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses.
* 10% level of signiﬁcance
** 5% level of signiﬁcance
*** 1% level of signiﬁcance
Corruption index: high score means low corruptionTab. 4.3: Growth regressions as in Eq(2), considering Forest Cover
Dependent Variable: gi (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Y i
70) 0.20 -0.08 -1.10*** -1.39*** -1.21*** -1.51***
(1.01) (-0.34) (-3.90) (-4.47) (-4.73) (-5.82)
Forest Cover -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01**
(-1.74) (-1.11) (-1.57) (-1.60) (-1.72) (-2.30)
Manufacturing Sector - 2.14*** 1.77*** 1.59*** 0.99* 1.19**
(2.86) (2.53) (2.33) (1.43) (1.81)
Corruption - - 0.55*** - 0.29** 0.26**
(4.49) (2.27) (1.95)
Rule of Law - - - 0.64*** - -
(5.10)
Openness - - - - 2.15*** 1.72***
(4.10) (3.35)
Investment - - - - - 1.27***
(3.07)
Constant -0.13 1.44 8.58*** 10.99*** 9.80*** 9.14***
(-0.08) (0.73) (3.92) (4.83) (4.95) (4.88)
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.09 0.34 0.38 0.46 0.52
N 103 92 72 72 70 70
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses.
* 10% level of signiﬁcance
** 5% level of signiﬁcance
*** 1% level of signiﬁcance
Corruption index: high score means low corruptionTab. 4.4: Growth regressions as in Eq(2), considering Forestry sector’s importance
Dependent Variable: gi (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Y i
70) 0.01 -0.33 -1.57*** -1.68*** -1.58*** -1.77***
(0.03) (-1.25) (-4.98) (-5.14) (-5.52) (-5.85)
Forest Sector -1.04** -1.29*** -1.99*** -1.43*** -1.66*** -1.53***
(-2.06) (-2.57) (-3.19) (-2.39) (-2.81) (-2.65)
Manufacturing Sector - 1.83*** 1.15** 1.14** 0.66 0.87
(2.50) (1.72) (1.71) (0.94) (1.31)
Corruption - - 0.68 - 0.46*** 0.41***
(5.84) (3.54) (3.17)
Rule of Law - - - 0.70*** - -
(5.85)
Openness - - - - 1.73*** 1.47***
(3.47) (2.92)
Investment - - - - - 0.87**
(2.14)
Constant 1.33 3.61** 12.28*** 13.25 12.57*** 11.89***
(0.70) (1.65) (4.89) (5.09) (5.39) (5.18)
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.12 0.40 0.40 0.48 0.51
N 103 91 71 71 69 69
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses.
* 10% level of signiﬁcance
** 5% level of signiﬁcance
*** 1% level of signiﬁcance
Corruption index: high score means low corruptionTab. 4.5: Potential transmission channels
Dependent Variable: Terms Manufacturing Corruption Openness Investment
of trade sector
Forest Sector -0.40 1.74e-06*** -0.48 -0.35*** -0.75***
(-0.59) (2.66) (-0.75) (-3.67) (-5.66)
Constant 0.09 0.29 3.41 0.47 2.90
(0.26) (9.03) (13.16) (9.50) (44.81)
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.18
N 128 109 83 116 143
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses.
* 10% level of signiﬁcance
** 5% level of signiﬁcance
*** 1% level of signiﬁcance
4.4.3 IV estimations
4.4.4 Instruments
Growth regressions are habitually subject to the problem of endogenous variable. Does trade
cause growth, or does growth involve trade? Are good institutions a sine qua non condi-
tion to long term growth, or does economic development enhance better institutions? The
resource curse literature usually does not consider this problem of endogeneity when consid-
ering control variables. In this section, we build on earlier growth literature to instrument
institutional quality and openness. An good instrument is a variable that aﬀect growth only
through the instrumented variable.
First, we use the Frankel and Romer (1999) indicator to instrument openness. In their
paper, the authors use a constructed share of trade based on geographical characteristics,
in order to get rid of endogeneity. Moreover, the Sachs and Warner criteria used in the
precedent section may be criticized because of its de jure character, in contrast with de facto
character, such as the Frankel and Romer instrument. Finally, ﬁgure (4.5) shows the strong
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Second, we instrument institutional quality with the log of European settlers mortality
(Acemoglu et al., 2001). Indeed, institutions may be related to this historical characteristic:
settlers are likely to have set better institutions in less risky regions, which should be related
somehow to current institutions. Figure (4.6) shows this relationship between settlers mor-
tality and today rule of law indicator. However, our data for settlers mortality is quite small
(51 observations). Thus we also instrument institutional quality with an index of ethnic
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4.4.5 Results
Results are given in table (4.6). First, note that the constructed share of trade used to
approximate openness is not signiﬁcant, and that its sign is not stable when changing other
control variables. Second, the log of settlers mortality and the index of ethnic fragmentation
have the expected sign and are quite signiﬁcant.
Considering our forest endowment indicator, the estimation does not change the result
much when instruments are introduced. The sign related to our absolute forest endowment
indicator (Forest Area) does not change and even becomes slightly signiﬁcant, while our
relative endowment indicator (Forest Area) is still negatively related to growth.
Considering forestry sector’s importance, the introduction of the Acemoglu instrument
change the sign of the relationship, and the coeﬃcient is even slightly signiﬁcant. This
result may be explained by the potential relationship between settlers mortality and forest
exploitation. Indeed, Acemoglu et al. (2001) note that ”colonization strategy was inﬂuenced
by the feasibility of settlements. In places where the disease environment was not favorable
to European settlement, the cards were stacked against the creation of Neo-Europes, and the








































2 4 6 8
Settlers mortality (Acemoglu, 2001)
95% CI Fitted values
woodgdp90
Settlers mortality and forest exploitation
countries with high settlers mortality experience today important forestry sectors (see ﬁgure
4.7). The use of the instrument when investigating for a resource curse may thus lead to
biased estimates. Forest Sector keeps the expected sign when using ethnic fragmentation as
an instrument, although the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant.Tab. 4.6: Growth regressions as in Eq(2), using diﬀerent instruments
Dependent Variable: gi (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Y i
70) -1.57*** -1.18*** -1.38*** -1.09*** -1.36*** -1.08***
(-5.44) (-4.45) (-3.87) (-4.28) (-3.85) (-3.93)
Forest Cover 4.03e-06* 2.71e-06 - - - -
(1.52) (1.14)
Forest Area - - -0.01 -0.02** - -
(1.27) (2.29)
Forest Sector - - - - 1.32* -0.48
(1.64) (-1.00)
Manufacturing Sector 1.10 2.27*** 1.04 2.13*** 1.31 1.99***
(0.99) (3.50) (0.91) (3.35) (1.21) (2.99)
Investment 1.29*** 1.73*** 1.42*** 1.83*** 1.47*** 1.61***
(3.35) (6.22) (3.72) (6.72) (3.87) (5.53)
Settlers Mortality -0.47** - -0.41* - -0.61** -
(-1.90) (1.66) (-2.30)




0.01 0.02* -0.004 0.005 -0.003 0.01
(0.44) (1.31) (-0.18) (0.42) (0.15) (1.02)
Constant 11.85*** 5.66*** 10.57*** 5.48*** 10.20*** 5.38**
(3.27) (2.85) (2.91) (2.85) (2.83) (2.48)
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.40 0.33 0.42 0.34 0.36
N 51 87 51 87 51 86
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses.
* 10% level of signiﬁcance
** 5% level of signiﬁcance
*** 1% level of signiﬁcance4.5 Conclusion
Are resource-rich countries also cursed by their resource endowments for environmental qual-
ity? When focusing on forest resources, it appears that countries with important forest cover
tend to deforest more than countries with small forest cover. This result is somehow intuitive:
a very abundant resource is less valuated than a scarce one. More interestingly, countries
exploiting their forest endowments intensively also tend to deforest more than countries
with small forest sectors. This result gives the insight that forest exploitation is mainly
unsustainable worldwide. A conventional view would be to think that forest exploitation is
unsustainable only in countries with poor institutions. However the estimated tendency is
robust to the addition of corruption or institutional index, which appears to be an alarming
information. Conversely, countries relying on other natural resources do not seem to deforest
more than countries not relying on this sector. Moreover, relying on natural resource ex-
ploitation is positively linked to the forest cover when corruption is considered in the control
variables.
The second question this paper proposes to investigate is whether forests constitute a re-
source curse. This question is particularly interesting because, in contrast with the resource-
curse literature, it allows to consider separately endowments and exploitation. Overall it
seems that neither forest endowments nor forest exploitation represent a resource curse.
Indeed, compared to mineral resources such as oil, diamond or gas are directly proﬁtable,
forests seem to represent a too small economic value to have macro level impacts and induce
a resource curse. First, a country cannot totally specialize in forest exploitation in the way
middle east countries have specialized in oil exploitation. Second, even if its exploitation
may enhance rent seeking and corrupted behaviors, these perverse eﬀects appear to be of too
small scale to have country level impacts. Finally, because of this relatively low economic
value, countries are not likely to jeopardize their future development by relying too much on
forest exploitation.
Countries with relatively large forestry sector’s economic importance tend nevertheless
to grow slower than countries with relatively small forestry sectors. This statement can be
explained by the fact that relying on forest exploitation may be a draw back for countries
already experiencing low growth and bad institutional development.Overall, forests do not seem to have macro level perverse eﬀects. Forests could still,
however, represent a resource curse at a regional level inside countries. A region with large
forest endowments and specialized in forest exploitation may experience lower grow and bad
development. This potential regional eﬀect opens scale for future research.
Appendix A: variable description
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Deforestation Percentage of variation of the forest cover for the
period 1990-2005.
FAO
gi Average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between the years
1970 and 1990.
Penn World Tables
Forest Area Total forest extend (ha), in 1990. FAO
Forest Cover Proportion of land area covered
by forest in 1990. FAO
Forest Sector Roundwood production (m3)
divided by GDP in 1990. FAO




70) Natural log of real GDP divided by the economi-
cally active population in 1970.
Penn World Tables
(GDP) and World








Corruption Corruption in government index. Scored 0-6. Low





(IRIS), 1982Rule of Law Rule of law index. The variable ”reﬂects the de-
gree to which citizens of a country are willing to
accept the established institutions to make and im-






Openness The fraction of years during the period 1970-1990
in which the country is rated as an open economy.
Sachs and Warner cri-
teria, 1995
Investment Natural log of the ratio of real gross domestic in-
vestment (public plus private) to real GDP aver-





Log of European settlers mortality Acemoglu et al., 2001
Ethnic Fragmen-
tation
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 1960.
Measures probability that two randomly selected
people from a given country will not belong to the
same ethnolinguistic group.
Levine et al., 2003
Constructed
Share of Trade
Constructed Share of trade based on geographic
characteristics
Frankell and Romer,
19995. ARE CONSUMER BOYCOTTS EFFECTIVE?
Abstract
This paper derives the conditions of success of a consumer boycott generated by
environmental preferences. Overall the chance of success of this kind of boycott appears to
be small. Indeed, consumers the most able to hurt the targeted ﬁrm’s proﬁt also have the
highest opportunity cost of boycotting. Thus they are less likely to participate in the
boycott. Conversely, consumers the most involved in the boycott have high environmental
preferences and small amounts of consumption, which prevent them from hurting the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt enough. Moreover, coordination issues and free riding reduce considerably the
likelihood of boycott success.
Keywords: consumer boycott, war of attrition, environment, technology choice.
JEL classiﬁcation: D11, D21, Q59.
5.1 Introduction
A new consumption pattern has emerged recently. Nowadays citizens often use consumption
as a political act, ”a new way to save the world” (Mc Laughlin, 2004). Indeed, these con-
sumption practices constitute a way to signal preferences and to conciliate consumption with
social, environmental or health considerations. Among this tendency, consumer boycotts are
for unsatisﬁed consumers a way to compensate for governments inactivity. They constitute a
substitute to public policies. The objective is to put enough pressure on the target to make
it adopt fair practices.
”Economic consumer boycotts” (Friedman, 1999), i.e. the individual or collective choice
of not buying some product, is now a frequently used tool by NGOs or lobby groups to
protest against unfair marketing, social or environmental practices. For example, in 1959,
a group of South African exiles and their British supporters called for a boycott of fruits,
cigarettes and other goods imported from South Africa to oppose apartheid. More recently, aboycott of Israeli products and tourism followed decades of refusal to abide by UN resolutions,
International Humanitarian law and the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Consumer boycotts upon environmental arguments are a strategy commonly used by
many environmental NGOs. A ﬁrst example is the boycott of cosmetic ﬁrms (e.g: Proc-
ter and Gamble, Colgate-Palmolive), because of their use of animal testing. Another case
is the boycott of major oil companies (e.g: Total, ESSO, Shell), for their environmental
damages and their supposed lobbying eﬀorts to deter climate change policies. Some large
fast-food companies (e.g: McDonald’s) have been targeted by boycott campaigns because
of their supposed environmental unfriendly way to produce meat. Finally, some NGOs sup-
port the boycott of non-certiﬁed tropical timber, to protest against unsustainable harvest
practices and corruption. In 2004, WALHI, the Indonesia’s largest environmental group,
and several other environmental groups, have called for a boycott of timber from Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore and China, countries where illegal logging plagues local development
and environmental indicators.
Most researchers have focused on ﬁeld studies (Miller and Sturdivan, 1977; Pruitt and
Friedman, 1986; Garrett, 1987; Koku et al., 1997; Teoh et al. 1999) or history of consumer
boycotts (Friedman, 1985, 1995; Smith, 1990). Tyran and Engelmann (2005) provide an
experimental analysis of consumer boycotts. Overall, most papers conclude a weak impact
of consumer boycotts on the ﬁrms behavior.
Only few papers provide theoretical analysis of consumer boycotts. First, Innes (2006)
considers a duopoly choosing between a clean and a dirty technology, while environmental
organizations (EO) may invest in consumer boycotts to deter the choice of the dirty technol-
ogy. The boycott eﬀectiveness is determined by the EO’s investment. Second, Baron (2002)
considers that the action of boycotting by some consumers provides information to the other
citizens about the seriousness of a situation. Boycotting constitute a way for consumers
to signal their private information. Finally, Diermayer and Van Mieghem (2005) describe
coordination between boycotting consumers as a stochastic process with threshold eﬀects.
Analyzing under which conditions a consumer boycott is eﬀective, this paper makes a
simple point: boycott successes are quite unlikely, due to a simple trade oﬀ between the
opportunity cost of boycotting and the boycott potential to hurt the ﬁrm’s proﬁt.We consider a boycott eﬀective if it induces a change in the targeted ﬁrm’s behavior
consistent with the boycotting group’s objective. Therefore, we do not discuss the case of a
boycott of which the aim is only to signal disapproval to its target. We focus on environmental
boycotts, but consumer boycotts upon social and health considerations follow roughly the
same analysis.
Consider a ﬁrm producing a good with a polluting technology, with no government inter-
vention to internalize the negative externality. This ﬁrm could opt for another technology,
less or not polluting, but more expensive. The choice of the cheap and polluting technology
is the result of a proﬁt maximization. The success of an environmental boycott is therefore
determined by its capacity of hurting the ﬁrm’s proﬁt enough to make the second technology
more proﬁtable. In this context, the main factor determining the success of the boycott is
the consumer preferences, which induce the demand structure.
Conditions of success of an environmental boycott depend on several market character-
istics. First, the consumers environmental preferences may create some scale for ecological
certiﬁcation and product diﬀerentiation. With free entry, a second ﬁrm may enter the market
and provide the good with clean production. Market structure is not considered explicitly
in this paper. Only one ﬁrm is boycotted and the existence of an imperfect substitute is
considered, of which the production is clean but which provides lower utility.
Second, information is crucial on both sides of the problem. On the one hand, the ﬁrm
needs to have complete and perfect information of the demand side and of the consumers
preferences in its proﬁt maximization (for otherwise, there is room for signaling boycott).
On the other hand, consumers also need good information on the demand characteristics,
available technologies and the boycott’s modalities.
Finally, coordination issues and strategic considerations are to be taken into account.
Indeed, even a potentially successful boycott may fail because of coordination failures. More-
over, boycotting is subject to free riding. Any individual consumer, even if unsatisﬁed with
the use of the polluting technology and hoping for the boycott to succeed, has an incentive
to free ride and to consume the good anyway. Anonymity of consuming behaviors reinforces
this incentive.
Of course, with perfect information, no coordination issue and no free rider behavior,
one could only witness successful boycotts. Indeed, in that case, the perfectly informed con-sumers would only participate in a boycott if its success is certain. However, we will ﬁrst
consider this best case scenario, in order to determine which patterns of the demand provide
room for successful environmental consumer boycotts. We assume therefore that both con-
sumers and the ﬁrm have perfect information about the demand patterns and the producing
process. Moreover, by assumption, the unsatisﬁed consumers behave as one community,
which avoid coordination failures and free riding. We only introduce a boycott eﬃciency
parameter, which considers the environmental organization’s capacity to overcome coordi-
nation problems. Imperfect information and strategic behaviors are to be introduced more
explicitly later in this paper.
In this context, an environmental consumer boycott resembles a complete information
war of attrition with asymmetric preferences between the targeted ﬁrm and the boycotting
consumers. Complete information war of attrition models were ﬁrst introduced by Maynard
Smith (1974, 1982), studying animal behavior. Economic applications of war of attrition
models include predatory pricing (Roth, 1996), exit in oligopoly (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1986) and the provision of public goods (Bilodeau and Slivinsky, 1996). Kornhauser et
al. (1989) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) proposed criteria for selection among potential
perfect equilibria.
Burton (2004) ﬁrst considers asymmetry in the players motivations in a war of attrition
model. A group of environmentalists decides to blockade the access to an indivisible resource
in order to preserve it, while a ﬁrm projects to harvest it. The player winning the conﬂict has
de facto property rights on the resource. The following model is an application of Burton’s
asymmetry in the context of a consumer boycott. A group of consumers decides to stop
consuming a good produced with a polluting technology, to induce the targeted ﬁrm to opt
for a clean technology. The ﬁrm prefers the use of the polluting technology because it is proﬁt
maximizing. Overall, potential for success of a consumer boycott depends on the trade oﬀ
between the hurting capacity of the boycotting group and the opportunity cost of boycotting.
Consumers the most able to hurt the ﬁrm’s proﬁt have large amounts of consumption. Thus,
their opportunity cost of boycotting is high. Overall, this simple tradeoﬀ makes the likelihood
of boycott success low.
Section 2 presents a complete information war of attrition model and section 3 analyzes
coordination patterns of heterogeneous consumers, with imperfect information. Section 4underlines the fact that free riding is a major problem of consumer boycotts. Finally, the
analysis is applied to real life boycotts in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
5.2 Boycott as a war of attrition with perfect information
A war of attrition is a model of aggression between two players. The game takes the form of a
succession of identical periods. Each period, the two players choose simultaneously between
remaining in the game or withdrawing. The model is stationary: each period represents
the same type of problem for both players, with no information gain nor change in costs or
beneﬁts. The winning player is the one able to remain longer in the game.
This model diﬀers from usual war of attrition models, because it considers asymmetric
motivations and payoﬀs. In the context studied here, the two players are a group of consumers
and a ﬁrm. Some consumers refuse to consume the ﬁrm’s good as long as it is produced
with a polluting technology. The consumers considered act as one single group. Potential
coordination failures between consumers are only considered through a boycott eﬃciency
parameter. Coordination issues are to be introduced more explicitly later in this paper.
Overall, both players compare their maximum conﬂict duration, which is the point in
time after which they would never plan to remain in the game. Indeed, with net cumulative
payoﬀs decreasing with time, there is a point in time at which these payoﬀs become negative.
Basically, if the maximum boycott duration of the consumers is larger than the maximum
conﬂict duration of the ﬁrm, the boycott is likely to succeed. Moreover, we assumer perfect
information. Thus, the two maximum durations are common knowledge. Therefore, the
player with a smaller maximum duration withdraws immediately.
The outcome of the game is therefore determined at the ﬁrst period. The best response for
consumers with a maximum duration smaller than the ﬁrm’s is to never boycott. Conversely,
the best response for a ﬁrm with a smaller maximum duration is to withdraw immediately.
The boycott is successful in that case.
5.2.1 Technology choice and consumers behavior
Firm’s technology choice: The ﬁrm has chosen between two technologies. Technology 1 (T1)
is cheap but polluting, while technology 2 (T2) is clean but more expensive. We consider thecase in which the ﬁrm has chosen technology 1, which implies that it generates larger proﬁt
than technology 2, i.e. π1 >π 2. The proﬁt schedules, π1 and π2, diﬀer simply because the
production costs, the price of the good and the demand structure are not the same whether
the good is produced with the dirty or the clean technology.
Consumption patterns: The consumers population is of size 1, with two homogeneous
groups. The environmentalists represent a share α, exogenously given, of the population.
The utility of an environmentalist increases with his individual consumption and decreases
with the total amount of pollution. The environmentalists are unsatisﬁed with technology 1
and would prefer the ﬁrm to produce with technology 2: U1 <U 2. U1 is the utility derived
by an environmentalist if the good is produced with T1, and U2 is the utility for a good
produced with T2.
A share (1−α) of consumers only considers individual consumption in its utility function.
Therefore these consumers prefer the ﬁrm to use T1, because they do not care about pollution
and T1 is cheaper. Thus they would never participate in an eventual boycott. Moreover,
they do not moderate their consumption of the good, because they do not care about the
pollution induced by their consumption. Therefore they consume larger amounts of the good.
Boycott as a war of attrition: The environmentalists would prefer the ﬁrm to use tech-
nology 2. An environmental organization announces a consumer boycott, requiring for any
consumer unsatisﬁed with the use of technology 1 to stop consuming the good. Boycotting
consumers switch their consumption of the good for the consumption of an imperfect sub-
stitute that provides lower utility, but of which the production is clean. The utility derived
when boycotting is Ub.
As an extreme case, the targeted ﬁrm is in a monopoly position, and there is no substitute
available on the market. As another extreme, if the market is very competitive and diﬀeren-
tiated, there is room for ecological certiﬁcation: a ﬁrm may provide the good considered with
a clean production. In that case, boycotting is costless. More generally, a better substitute
provides higher utility of boycotting. Moreover, the action of boycotting may have an utility
by itself. Boycotting has therefore an opportunity cost, which is the diﬀerence between the
utility derived by the consumption of the good, and the utility of boycotting: ∆U = U1−Ub.λπ1 is the residual proﬁt of the ﬁrm under boycott. π1 is the residual proﬁt when every
environmentalist boycott and λ is an exogenous eﬃciency parameter measuring the environ-
mental organization’s capacity to coordinate consumers: 1 ≤ λ ≤
π1
π1. The EO is totally
eﬃcient in coordinating consumers if λ = 1, and there is full coordination failure if λ =
π1
π1.
The success of the boycott consists of hurting the ﬁrm’s proﬁt enough to make technology
2 more proﬁtable. In this context, a consumer boycott represents a kind of war of attrition,
with an asymmetry in the players motivations.
The set of strategies is the following. Each period, the environmentalists choose whether
to continue the boycott or to stop it, while the ﬁrm chooses whether to keep on using T1 or
to switch for a T2 production. Switching technology is costless, but there can be no switch
back.
The game proceeds as follow. Both players consider how long they could stay in the game
without making loss. The maximum boycott duration of the consumers and the maximum
conﬂict duration of the ﬁrm are the point in time at which their cumulative net payoﬀs
become negative. There is perfect information, which means that both maximum durations
are common knowledge. The player that has the shortest maximum duration will therefore
choose to withdraw immediately. Therefore the boycott is successful if the maximum boycott
duration is larger than the maximum conﬂict duration (see Appendix A).
Conditional on the parameters values, two kinds of outcome are possible. First, if the
maximum boycott duration of the consumers is shorter than the maximum conﬂict duration
of the ﬁrm, the best response for an environmentalist is to never boycott, while the ﬁrm’s
best response is to always keep T1. Conversely, for a maximum boycott duration longer than
the ﬁrm’s maximum duration, the best response for the consumers is always to boycott, while
the ﬁrm’s best response is to switch immediately for T2.
Thus the boycott outcome is reached at the ﬁrst period. This result is somehow dis-
appointing to describe real life boycotts. Nevertheless, this set up describes the necessary
conditions of the demand patterns for a successful boycott. Introducing imperfect informa-
tion and coordination issues will allow for multi-periods boycotts.5.2.2 Maximum conﬂict duration of the ﬁrm
Consider ﬁrst the ﬁrm’s net cumulative payoﬀ of winning the conﬂict after T periods. It
consists of the smaller proﬁt received during the boycott for T periods and the larger proﬁt
of keeping T1 forever. This cumulative payoﬀ is net of the alternative strategy, which is the
























Therefore, T f is the maximum duration after which the ﬁrm would never plan on con-
tinuing the conﬂict. For T f to be strictly positive, the full proﬁt under technology 1 must
be larger than under T2: π1 >π 2. Of course, if the proﬁt derived under T2 is larger than
under T1, the ﬁrm would never choose to use T1 and nobody would consider boycotting.
Note that if the residual proﬁt under boycott is larger than the proﬁt under T2, the payoﬀ
is always positive and the maximum duration would go to inﬁnity: λπ1 >π 2.I nt h a tc a s e ,
indeed, the boycott is not costly enough to make T2 more proﬁtable. The boycott could last
forever and the ﬁrm would never switch to T2.
5.2.3 Maximum boycott duration
The environmentalists net payoﬀ of winning the game after T periods consists of the dis-
counted utility of boycotting for T periods, plus the cumulative utility of having the good
produced with T2 forever. It is net of the alternative strategy, which is the discounted
























The environmentalists would never plan to boycott longer than T c periods. T c is positive
if the utility derived with a T2 production is larger than with a T1 production: U2 >U 1.Obviously, the environmentalists would never consider boycotting if they derive a larger
utility with T1. Similarly, T c goes to inﬁnity if the utility of boycotting is larger than the
T1 utility: Ub >U 1. Indeed, in that case, boycotting by itself provides a positive net utility.
The boycott could last forever even if the ﬁrm never switches to T2.
5.2.4 Outcome of the game
As shown before, the outcome of the game depends on the two maximum durations. If
T f >T c, the consumers know that they couldn’t stay long enough in the game to induce
a change in the ﬁrm’s behavior. Thus they will choose to withdraw immediately and will
never boycott. Conversely, if T c ≥ T f 1, the ﬁrm knows that it cannot stay longer in the
conﬂict than the consumers. Thus its best response is to switch immediately to T2.
There are several extreme cases, which lead to diﬀerent outcomes (see table 1). First, if
π2 >π 1, technology 2 is more proﬁtable than technology 1, and the boycott has no reason.
Second, if U1 >U 2, T1 is preferred by the consumers. There is therefore no boycott and the
ﬁrm keeps using T1.
Third, for π2 ≤ λπ1, the boycott is not costly enough (or coordination is too weak)
to induce the technology change. Indeed, if the decrease in the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is too small,
the ﬁrm always chooses to keep the polluting technology whatever is the behavior of the
environmentalists. In that case, if the opportunity cost is positive, the environmentalists
know that their pressure is too weak to induce the technology change, and they never boycott.
Fourth, if Ub >U 1, the environmentalists always boycott, whatever is the ﬁrm’s strategy.
In that case, the opportunity cost is negative, which means that consumers derive positive
net utility from boycotting. This case can explain why one may often witness unsuccessful
boycotts that never end. If the boycott is costless for some consumers, they always will
participate. But in that case, they are likely to have small amounts of consumption, which
generate a too small decrease in the ﬁrm’s proﬁt to make it change its behavior.
1 We assume implicitly that for T c = T f, the ﬁrm would be the one to withdraw. Let call it the ﬁrm’s
implicit preference for compromise. Thus we focus on pure strategies.Tab. 5.1: Outcome of the boycott
Utility Proﬁt T c T f Outcome
π2 >π 1 T f < 0 Technology 2 chosen by the ﬁrm
U1 >U 2 T c < 0 T1 preferred by the consumers, no boycott
U1 >U b π2 ≤ λπ1 T c > 0 T f →∞ T1 always kept, No boycott
U1 <U b π2 ≤ λπ1 T c →∞ T f →∞ T1 always kept, always boycott
U1 >U b π2 >λ π 1 T c > 0 T f > 0 Boycott successful if T c ≥ T f
T1 kept if T c <T f
Outcome for U1 >U b and λπ1 <π 2: For otherwise, i.e. for U1 >U b and λπ1 <π 2,
the outcome of the game is determined by the value of the parameters. In this case, we
can analyze which factors inﬂuence the two maximum lengths T f (see Appendix B) and T c
(Appendix C).
First, a more proﬁtable clean technology decreases the maximum conﬂict duration of the
ﬁrm T f: ∂Tf
∂π2 < 0. Conversely, a more proﬁtable dirty technology increases T f: ∂Tf
∂π1 > 0.
Finally, T f is larger if the residual proﬁt under boycott is small and the EO ineﬃcient to
coordinate consumers: ∂Tf
∂π1 > 0, ∂Tf
∂λ > 0.
Second, a larger utility derived from the clean technology increases T c: ∂Tc
∂U2 > 0. More-
over, a smaller T1 utility also increases T c: ∂Tc
∂U1 < 0. Finally, a higher utility of boycotting in-
creases the maximum boycott duration, by decreasing the boycott opportunity cost: ∂Tc
∂Ub > 0.
5.2.5 What make a boycott successful?
Quality of the substitute
The quality of the substitute increases the potential for success, by decreasing the opportu-
nity cost of boycotting. Our speciﬁcation does not consider the market structure explicitly.
However, considering an imperfect substitute allows for ﬂexibility in the analysis. As an
extreme case, if the ﬁrm is in a monopoly position, there is no substitute and Ub =0( a s -
suming boycotting provides no utility by itself). As another extreme, if the ﬁrm plays in a
very diﬀerentiated market, , there is room for ecological certiﬁcation or labeling, and another
ﬁrm may enter and provide the good with a clean production. The exploitation of this nichewould imply Ub ≥ U2 >U 1. Then the environmentalists would always choose to boycott,
because the boycott would be costless. Therefore, boycotts are more likely to succeed if
the targeted ﬁrm plays in a very diﬀerentiated and competitive market than if the ﬁrm is
a monopoly, because the opportunity cost is likely to be smaller. Moreover, boycotting a
single ﬁrm should be more eﬃcient than boycotting an entire sector, because it gives more
chance to ﬁnd a good substitute.
Moreover, this speciﬁcation of the utility of boycotting has some interesting implicit impli-
cations. First, boycotting may have an utility per se. Indeed, collective action participation
to improve the quality of the environment may provide positive utility for an environmen-
talist, which would be positively correlated with Ub. Second, the utility of boycotting is
likely to be positively correlated with the number of consumers participating in the boycott.
Indeed, being a part of a large community with noble objectives may increase a consumer’s
utility. In the context described here, the utility of boycotting is directly related to the share
of environmentalists (α) in the population. Third, the substitute, even if of good quality,
may be quite diﬃcult to ﬁnd on the market, which creates potentially important transaction
costs and thus reduces the utility of boycotting.
Demand structure
Overall, the chances of success of a consumer boycott depends on the ability to hurt the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt enough. Thus if the share of environmentalists consumption in the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
is large, the residual proﬁt under boycott will be low, because the boycott deprives the ﬁrm
of a large share of its proﬁt.
The residual proﬁt depends on the residual consumption. It is therefore decreasing in
the number of consumers participating in the boycott (α). Moreover, it is also decreasing
in the environmentalists consumption. Finally, it is increasing in the non-environmentalists
consumption.
The share of environmentalists in the population: A large number of environmentalists (α)
unambiguously raises the boycott potential for success. First, as mentioned before, it may
increase the utility of boycotting. Thus, it is negatively correlated with the opportunity
cost of boycotting and positively correlated with the maximum boycott duration of theconsumers (T c). On the other hand, a large boycotting population decreases the residual
proﬁt π1. Therefore, it decreases the maximum duration of the ﬁrm (T f).
The environmentalists consumption: The amount consumed by the environmentalists has
an ambiguous eﬀect on T f. Indeed, it decreases the proﬁt from technology 1 under boycott
(which has a negative impact on T f), but it increases the full proﬁt under technology 1
(which tends to increase T f). Overall, the amount consumed by environmentalist is likely to
decrease the maximum duration of the ﬁrm because it increases the pressure of the boycott,
by increasing the diﬀerence between π1 and π1. Thus it decreases T f.
The impact of the amount consumed by environmentalist consumers on T c is less straight-
forward. On the one hand, a larger amount consumed decreases indirectly the residual pol-
lution, which tends to decrease the opportunity cost. On the other hand, a consumer used
to consume large amounts of the boycotted good is likely to have a larger opportunity cost
than a small-amounts consumer, simply because he has a larger amount to renounce. A
larger environmentalist consumption thus increases directly the opportunity cost, because it
increases the amount to transfer for the substitute consumption. Overall the environmen-
talists consumption tends to decrease T c, because the direct consumption eﬀect is likely to
dominate the indirect pollution eﬀect.
Overall, it appears that the consumers the most able to hurt the ﬁrm’s proﬁt are also those
with the highest opportunity cost. Therefore, they are less likely to participate in the boycott.
In the light of this proposition, it is easier to understand the existence of inﬁnite consumer
boycotts that never succeed. Indeed, people participating in boycott campaigns are usually
those who are the most aware of and highly sensitive to their own pollution. Therefore, they
are likely to be in small number, because of their high sensibility to their environment, and to
be relatively small consumers, because they take into account the pollution induced by their
own consumption. Boycotting is costless for them, but their consumption only represents a
marginal share of the targeted ﬁrm’s proﬁt, and thus do not hurt the ﬁrm’s proﬁt much.
Take the example of the boycott of major oil companies because of their lobbying eﬀort
to deter climate change policies. Consumers the most likely to boycott these companies are
those who feel the highest negative utility from pollution. Even if no boycott is announced,
these consumers are likely to prefer using their bicycles or public transports to the frequentuse of their car, and their capacity to hurt the companies’ proﬁt is small. Conversely,
consumers the most able to hurt the ﬁrms proﬁt consume a lot of oil, and thus have high
opportunity cost, which make their participation to the boycott unlikely.
Its seems therefore interesting for NGOs willing to implement an environmental boycott to
work on the α, i.e. informing and educating non-environmentalist consumers to increase their
awareness of and sensitivity to their responsibility in the degradation of their environment.
Finally, the EO’s capacity to coordinate environmentalist consumers is important. Co-
ordination issues have only been considered through a boycott eﬃciency parameter. Coor-
dination can be introduced more relevantly by relaxing two restrictions of this model. First,
the environmentalists may not be perfectly aware of the threshold at which the ﬁrm decides
to switch technology. Moreover, these consumers may have heterogenous preferences, which
would induce heterogenous boycotting behaviors.
5.3 Coordination failure
We focus now on the consumers side and relax the perfect information assumption. There
are N environmentalists who would prefer the ﬁrm to switch for the clean technology. We
introduce here some heterogeneity between environmentalist consumers. We consider the
fact than consumers can have diﬀerent costs of boycotting and gains from a boycott success2.
Consumer i’s individual choice at time t is boycotting (Bi(t) = 1) or not boycotting (Bi(t)=





We adopt here a simpler boycott speciﬁcation. First, the ﬁrm would switch technology
if the boycotting population is greater than or equal to ns. This threshold at which the
boycott is successful is unknown to the environmentalists. They only have a probability
of success, which is conditional on the boycott importance: p[n(t) ≥ ns]. The boycott
success probability is zero if nobody boycott: p[0 ≥ ns] = 0. Moreover the boycott would
2 Consumers are classiﬁed according to their environmental preferences: consumer 1 has the highest
environmental preferences and individual N has the lowest environmental preferences.be successful for sure if every environmentalist was boycotting p[N ≥ ns]=1 . 3 Thus the
boycott is potentially successful, but the environmentalists need to coordinate.
We assume a basic structure of boycotting: consumers accept to pay a certain cost of
boycotting Ci, to receive a gain Gi in case of success. Overall, consumer i decides to boycott
at time t if his potential gain from a boycott success exceeds his cost of boycotting. Overall




Bi(t)=1if p[n(t) ≥ ns]Gi − Ci ≥ 0
Bi(t)=0if p[n(t) ≥ ns]Gi − Ci < 0
(5.6)
Considering this equation, one can derive the participation threshold pi =
Ci
Gi at which




Bi(t)=1if p[n(t) ≥ ns] ≥ pi
Bi(t)=0if p[n(t) ≥ ns] < pi
(5.7)
A ﬁrst comment is that environmentalist consumers will enter sequentially in the boy-
cott. Strong environmentalists, who have low costs of boycotting and small participation
thresholds, will participate ﬁrst. As the boycott importance and the probability of success
grow, consumers with higher thresholds of boycotting decide to participate. Thus the ﬁrst
consumers deciding to boycott are those with negative costs of boycotting. Their participa-
tion threshold is therefore: pi = 0. As time goes on, the boycott importance grows as long
as the probability of success gets larger than or equal to the probability threshold of some
consumers.
Therefore the last consumer n deciding to boycott is deﬁned as follows. It deﬁnes also
the equilibrium boycott participation.





Figure (5.1) gives a representation of the equilibrium boycott population, which is the
intersection between the two curves p[n(t) ≥ ns]a n dpi. The boycott is successful if n ≥ ns.
Overall, this equilibrium boycott participation and thus the potential for success depend on
the distribution of boycotting costs and the beliefs structure. Coordination needs optimistic
3 The beliefs formation is not considered here. This belief structure can be due to the ﬁrm’s reputation
or other boycott experiences.Fig. 5.1: Equilibrium boycott population
Parameters: p: Chi2 distribution
p[n(t) ≥ ns]: normal distribution
N = 10000,n = 7296
consumers about the ﬁrm’s withdrawal threshold ns. Moreover, the consumers distribution
needs to have fat tails, i.e. a large number of strong environmentalists, with low participation
thresholds.
Figure (5.2) gives an example of coordination failure. The boycott would be successful if
every environmentalist would participate. However, the consumers distribution (uniform in
the case of ﬁgure (5.2)) and the beliefs structure (normal distribution) is such that nobody
decides to boycott in equilibrium.
Overall one can easily see that even a potentially successful boycott may be ineﬀective
due to coordination failures, even if a boycott success could be an equilibrium. Moreover,
boycotting may enhance free riding.Fig. 5.2: Unsuccessful boycott due to coordination failure
Parameters: p: uniform distribution
p[n(t) ≥ ns]: normal distribution
N = 10000,n =0
5.4 Boycott and free riding
In the ﬁrst two sections, the environmentalists were considering two strategies and related
payoﬀs. The ﬁrst strategy consists of participating in a potentially successful boycott, while
the second one is not participating. In this case, we considered that the boycott was un-
successful for sure. However, the choice of an environmentalist could come from comparing
participating in a potentially successful boycott and not participating in a potentially suc-
cessful boycott. In other words, any individual could decide to free ride, i.e not to participate
in the boycott while hoping for it to succeed.
In this case, any individual environmentalist participates if the expected payoﬀ of partic-
ipating exceeds the expected payoﬀ of not participating, conditional on the boycott success.
Basically, boycotting consists of paying a cost (Ci) for sure (i.e not consuming the good)
to receive a potential gain Gi (i.e the technology switch). In contrast, there is no direct
cost of not boycotting, but this strategy also provides a potential gain: the boycott may be










Therefore the choice of boycotting depends on the impact of the individual choice of













Overall the probability of the boycott success only increases marginally with the choice of
an individual consumer. Thus, the diﬀerence between the two probabilities is close to zero,
and only consumers with small
Ci
Gi ratios participate in the boycott.
5.5 Case studies
5.5.1 Shell and the Brent Spar case
In 1995, Shell Oil was planning to sink a 14 500 ton oil platform in the North Atlantic sea. The
environmental organization Greanpeace initiated a vast protestation movement to oppose
this practice. Activists occupied the Brent Spar platform, 200 Shell service stations were
threatened in Germany and a widespread boycott of Shell took place. After a few months,
Shell canceled its plan for deep sea disposal and decided to recycle the entire structure.
Several insights given in this paper can help to explain this boycott success. First, oil is
quite an homogeneous good, and oil stations are easy to ﬁnd almost anywhere. Therefore, one
can consider that the non-polluting substitute (i.e oil companies not sinking the platform) is
perfect, and the only transaction cost is going from any Shell station to the next oil station,
which is likely to be quite low. Overall, boycotting shell was costless (Ub ≥ U1).
Moreover, sinking costs (π1) were estimated at 11.8 million pounds, while the alternative
method costs (π2) were estimated at 46 million pounds. Considering the fact that Shell is
a worldwide multinational, maybe this diﬀerence in costs was quite small compared to the
size of the boycotting population, which reduces the maximum duration of the ﬁrm.
In other words, Shell was almost costless to boycott and easy to hurt, which can explain
why the Brent Spar case is often considered as an example of successful boycott.5.5.2 Cosmetic ﬁrms and animal testing
Animal testing (on invertebrates, rabbits, primates) is a commonly used practice in several
industries (e.g: cosmetics, pharmaceutical companies). This practice is considered as incom-
patible with animal rights by many environmentalists. Several environmental organizations
provide lists of companies using animal testing, in order to induce consumer boycotts.
Following this paper analysis, this type of consumer boycott has very few chances to
succeed. Indeed, boycotting ﬁrms using animal testing is almost equivalent to boycott the
entire cosmetic sector. Good substitutes (cosmetic ﬁrms not using animal testing) are there-
fore diﬃcult to ﬁnd and transaction costs are likely to be high. For example, ”Ahimsa”, a
French organization lobbying for animal protection, lists more than 200 ﬁrms testing their
products on animals (cosmetic ﬁrms and others). Note ﬁrst that it is diﬃcult to perfectly
memorize a 200 ﬁrms list. There is therefore a problem of clarity of the boycott, which
reduces considerably the utility of boycotting.
However, focusing on cosmetic ﬁrms, one can ﬁnd good substitute on the market. For
example, ”bodyshop” provides products free of animal testing. But even in this case, there
may be important transaction costs: although getting more and more important, bodyshop
is not a trademark very easy to ﬁnd worldwide. For instance, it can be very diﬃcult to ﬁnd
bodyshop shops for people not living in large cities.
Overall, boycotting ﬁrms using animal testing should not be very eﬀective, especially
because of high transaction costs, due to a lack of clarity in the boycott and diﬃculties to
purchase good substitutes. It is thus likely that only strong environmentalists participate in
this type of boycott and their hurting capacity is probably quite small. Moreover, alternative
strategies to animal testing, although an important research topic (see Johns Hopkins Center
for Alternatives to Animal Testing) may be still probably far from proﬁtability.
5.5.3 Boycott of non-certiﬁed timber
Several NGOs militate for a boycott of non-certiﬁed tropical timber. Indeed, illegal logging
in developing countries plagues local development and degrades forest resources. This type
of boycott ﬁrst appears to be a perfect case for a success. Indeed, timber is quite an homo-geneous good. Moreover, ecological timber certiﬁcation oﬀers good substitutes. Overall, the
opportunity cost of boycotting non-certiﬁed tropical timber seems to be quite low.
However, a second look mitigates this ﬁrst impression. First, quite a few ecological labels
exist (SmartWood, Scientiﬁc Certiﬁcation Systems, Certiﬁed Wood Products Council, Good
Wood, Forest Stewardship Council), which may create confusion and decrease the clarity of
the boycott. Consumers might be lost in determining which label is the most environmental-
friendly, which creates an indirect cost of information searching.
Moreover, boycotting consumers stand mainly in developed countries, while the most
important part of tropical timber is consumed in the country of production. The World
Resource Institute estimates that only 20% of the wood produced is exported (Rezende de
Azevedo et al., 2001). Potential impact of the boycotting population is thus fairly small,
because tropical timber oﬀers multiple markets options, which reduces the boycott inﬂuence.
Finally, boycotting tropical timber may have adverse eﬀects on the land use. Indeed, the
aim is to decrease forest over-exploitation, by decreasing the value of non-certiﬁed timber.
However, if the value of the exploited forest decreases too much, it may create an incentive
for land use change and thus increase deforestation. Indeed, the landowner may choose to
convert devaluated forest land into agriculture or pasture.
Overall, the boycott of non-certiﬁed timber, although presenting small opportunity cost,
does not oﬀer much potential for success, mainly because of a too small concerned population.
5.6 Conclusion
This paper explores the conditions under which a consumer boycott upon environmental
considerations may be successful. A boycott is presented here as a war of attrition between
a ﬁrm and a group of consumers, for the choice of the producing technology.
The ﬁrst model presented is quite simple. Indeed, assuming perfect information, no
coordination issue, nor free riding, the outcome of the boycott is known as soon as it begins.
For the most common case, with a positive opportunity cost of boycotting, boycotts never
really happen: either the threat of the boycott is enough to induce an immediate change
in the ﬁrm’s behavior, or this threat is too weak and consumers do not boycott. Moreover,environmentalist consumers act as one community, which is quite diﬀerent from real life
boycotts.
However, even with this very simple set up, some interesting implications can be derived.
The ability of the boycotting group to hurt the ﬁrm’s proﬁt enough is the main element
determining the chance of success of such type of action. Thus the share of the boycotting
group’s demand in total demand is crucial. Nevertheless, this share is directly related to the
boycott opportunity cost. Indeed, the boycotting group needs to be composed of important
consumers to hurt the ﬁrm’s proﬁt (especially if the group is of small size). However, boy-
cotting is more costly for a large-amount consumer, who has to renounce to a higher utility
of consumption.
Overall, it appears that this tradeoﬀ makes consumer boycotts unlikely to succeed. This
might explain why one can witness so few successful boycotts in real life: boycotting groups
are usually composed of consumers with small opportunity costs, whose boycott does not
hurt the targeted ﬁrm’s proﬁt enough to make it change its behavior.
A potentially more eﬃcient policy for NGOs would be to work on the share of the pop-
ulation sensitive to the quality of the environment. Indeed, the game presented here is
static, but informing and educating consumers may increase their awareness of environmen-
tal degradation, especially the degradation they are responsible of. The objective of this
policy would have two main consequences in the long run. First, it would induce a decrease
in overall consumption, which would reduce environmental degradation. Second, this would
increase the population likely to participate in environmental boycotts. In the long run,
the combination of education and boycott would increase the potential for environmental
friendly technology adoption.
Although this model does not consider explicitly the market structure, it seems reasonable
to assume that competition increases the chances for the clean technology to be present on
the market. Indeed, if there is free entry, there is room for ecological certiﬁcation and green
labeling: a ﬁrm may choose to enter the market and to produce the good with the clean
technology, if it is proﬁtable. In that case, there is a perfect substitute on the market. In
a monopoly case, consumer boycotts are less likely to succeed, because there is no good
substitute for which the environmentalists could switch their consumption. Finally, even ifthe demand structure allows for boycott success, consumers need to coordinate and avoid
free riding.
Considering a public choice approach, being conﬁdent in such consumers actions would
be a tempting consideration: governments could just let citizens take their destiny in their
own hands to make ﬁrms adopt fair practices. However, in the light of this paper, it seems
that consumer boycotts do not constitute a good substitute to public policies. Indeed, if the
emergence of political consumption practices may be a good tool to signal citizen preferences,
its eﬀectiveness considering ﬁrms practices and environmental quality is doubtful.
A potentially eﬀective policy for governments willing to increase the inﬂuence of this
political consumption could be to facilitate the emergence of credible and trustful ecological
certiﬁcation, giving comprehensive and clear set of rules deﬁning labeled products. Another
policy that could enhance boycott successes is to tax more heavily polluting technology, or
to subside clean technology. Indeed, this type of policy would reduce the diﬀerence between
the proﬁts derived by the dirty and the clean technology, which would decrease the ﬁrm’s
maximum conﬂict duration. Increasing taxes on polluting technology would increase boycotts
success likelihood. Thus, environmental policies and consumer boycotts do not seem to be
good substitute, but they may be eﬀective complement.
Appendix A: maximum durations and game equilibrium
This appendix follows Burton’s (2005) application. We consider ﬁrst responses to each
player’s conjectures, and then consider which duration both players actually choose.
Response to conjectures: Consider that the ﬁrm believes that the consumers have chosen
as strategy to boycott for a strictly positive duration ˆ Dc, and then withdraw. This strategy
cannot be distinguished from the ”always boycott”strategy.
The ﬁrm must decide to remain in the conﬂict for ˆ Dc +1 periods, or to withdraw imme-
diately. Indeed, withdrawing immediately is preferable that remaining less than ˆ Dc periods.
If the maximum duration of the ﬁrm is less than or equal to the conjecture on the consumer
boycott length, T f < ˆ Dc , the best strategy for the ﬁrm is to withdraw immediately.Similarly, the consumers may conjecture that the ﬁrm has chosen to remain in the conﬂict
for ˆ Df periods, and then withdraw. If the maximum boycott duration is smaller than this
conjecture T c < ˆ Df , the best strategy for the consumers is not to boycott at all.
Strategy choice: To succeed, both players have to choose a longer duration than its conjec-
ture: Df > ˆ Dc, Dc ≥ ˆ Df. This is known to both players, which also know the maximum
durations T f and T c.
”A rational player will use those strategies that are best responses to some beliefs he might
have about the strategies of his opponents” (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Therefore it is
not rationalizable to both player to conjecture a duration that is shorter than the shortest
maximum duration (min(T c,Tf)).
Thus, if the ﬁrm has the shortest maximum duration T f <T c, both can conclude that
the consumers would choose a larger duration: ˆ Dc >T f. In this case, the ﬁrm would be
better oﬀ withdrawing immediately and the boycott would be successful in that case.
Appendix B: factors inﬂuencing Tf

























(π2 − λπ1)(π1 − λπ1)lnρ
> 0 (5.14)


















(U1 − Ub)(U2 − Ub)lnρ
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